IMAGINING A PROGRESSIVE AND COMPREHENSIVE
CONSUMPTION TAX
Sean Raft*
INTRODUCTION

“If you love those who love you, what reward will you get? Are not
even the tax collectors doing that?”1

Tax collection is no stranger to

enmity.2 Imagining tax systems plagued by corruption, extortion, and the
imposition of exorbitant rates could explain this historic unpopularity. But
one would have a difficult time establishing either extortion or the
imposition of exorbitant rates within the American income tax system. In
fact, one would be hard-pressed to show that the tax rates imposed under
the American income tax system are seriously unfair. Yet, discontent with
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1
Matthew 5:46; Luke 6:32-36.
2
If nothing else, the Biblical references are evidence of an historic loathing for tax
collection: “While Jesus was having dinner at Matthew’s house, many tax collectors and
sinners came and ate with him and his disciples. When the Pharisees saw this, they asked
his disciples, ‘Why does your teacher eat with tax collectors and sinners?’ On hearing this,
Jesus said, ‘It is not the healthy who need a doctor, but the sick. Go and learn what this
means: ‘I desire mercy, not sacrifice.’ For I have come to call not the righteous, but
sinners.” Matthew 9:10-13; Mark 2:13-17; Luke 5:27-32. See also Matthew 21:31-32;
Mark 3:15. Calumniations notwithstanding, in perhaps one of the more famous passages of
the New Testament, Jesus diplomatically instructs his followers to pay their taxes
nonetheless: “Give to Caesar what is Caesar’s, and to God what is God’s.” Matthew
22:21; Mark 12:13-17; Luke 20:20-26.
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the system continues to grow.3 Since there is no extortion, and since the
rates are not exorbitant, the question is whether American taxpayers have a
compelling reason to loathe tax collection. It appears they do.
The odiousness of the American income tax system is not caused
entirely by a fight over money. Of course, it is true that most taxpayers
believe the income tax system asks too much of them4 and that they are not
getting much in return.5 But, while taxpayers are understandably hesitant
about paying more taxes,6 the real problem with the income tax system is
not the tax itself; it is how the tax is collected.

Indeed, taxpayers

overwhelmingly agree that the income tax system’s collection mechanism is

3

Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax
System, 112 YALE L.J. 261, 272 (2002) (“From the period immediately following World
War II until 1972, the American people viewed the income tax as the fairest tax in the
nation. Since 1980, they have consistently viewed it as the least fair.”).
4
According to the 2006 Tax Foundation’s Annual Survey of U.S. Attitudes on Tax
and Wealth (Q645), fifty-nine percent of those surveyed believed that the amount of federal
income tax they pay is “too high.” This figure rose four percent from the prior year. The
2006 survey is available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/survey_topline20060405.pdf (last visited June 2, 2006). See also Special Report No. 141, available at
http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/sr141.pdf (reporting and interpreting the suvery results)
(last visited June 12, 2006).
5
In the 2006 Tax Foundation survey (Q635), sixty-six percent of those surveyed
believed that the personal value they receive from paying taxes is only fair or poor; twentyfour percent of those surveyed believed the value received was “pretty good” while only
two percent considered it “excellent.”
6
According to the 2005 Tax Foundation Annual Survey on U.S. Attitudes on Taxes
and Wealth (Q640), sixty-four percent of those surveyed believed the government should
decrease services and taxes or keep taxes and services the same. Only thirteen percent of
those surveyed believed the government should increase services and raise taxes. The 2005
survey is available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/topline-20050414.pdf (last visited
June 2, 2006). Moreover, in the 2006 survey (Q727 & Q729), seventy-nine percent
indicated they would not be willing to pay an additional $2,470 in federal taxes to eliminate
the deficit and sixty-three percent believed, if forced to pay the additional $2,470, Congress
would only increase spending and not pay off the deficit. Twenty percent believed
Congress would pay off the debt but increase spending nonetheless (Q729).
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now far too complicated either to understand or implement.7
Taxpayers are unhappy because the method of collection under the
American income tax system places the filing burden on them.8 While the
burden associated with filing taxes may escape condemnation as
involuntary servitude,9 it is arguably unfair and almost certainly unwise.10
Admittedly, if no other practical means of securing governmental revenue
exists, perhaps requiring individuals to calculate and file their own taxes,
7

In the 2006 Tax Foundation Annual Survey (Q685), eighty percent of those surveyed
found the current federal income tax either very complicated or somewhat complicated.
Only nine percent of those surveyed believed the system was “not too complex” and only
one percent found it “not complex at all.” Many scholars also believe the income tax is
unnecessarily complicated. “Studies of the federal income tax code consistently find that
the current system is excessively complex. This study concurs, quantifying the code’s
complexity in a way that makes it clear how unnecessary much of it is. If the high cost of
complying with the federal income tax were a necessary price to pay for a fair and effective
tax system, there would be little room for complaint. But in fact, most complaints are
justified.” J. Scott Moody et al., The Rising Cost of Compying with the Federal Income
Tax, Tax Foundation Special Report No. 138 at 2 (Dec. 2005).
8
The 2005 Tax Foundation Annual Survey (Q680) found seventy percent of those
surveyed either disliked or hated working on their income taxes.
9
Although the rationale behind the precedent is largely unexplained, the precedent
itself is fairly clear. See, e.g., LaRue v. United States, 959 F. Supp. 957, 959 (C.D. Ill.
1997) (finding plaintiff’s unsupported claim that the income tax violated the Thirteenth
Amendment was “absurd”); Trohimovich v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 869 P.2d 95, 98
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (“Trohimovich also claims that the payment of taxes is a violation
of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting slavery. He is wrong. Payment of taxes does not
constitute a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment against involuntary servitude.”); Kasey
v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 457 F.2d 369, 370 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that a claim
that the income tax filing burden amounted to involuntary servitude as “without merit”);
Abney v. Campbell, 206 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1953) (finding a claim that the income tax
violated the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against involuntary servitude was “farfetched”).
10
It is safe to say filing burdens have reached unhealthy levels. And, while the advent
of e-filing may or may not relieve some of the burden, it does not eliminate it entirely. See
Mary Dalrymple, San Jose Mercury News, GE Files Tax Return That’s 24,000 Pages:
Would Have Been Eight Feet Tall (June 1, 2006) (“[General Electric] filed a 24,000-page
tax return to the Internal Revenue Service this month. If it were paper, it would stack up 8
feet high. But instead of sending boxes to the tax collectors, GE filed its return
electronically
–
all
237
megabytes
of
it.”),
available
at
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/business/14714255.htm (last visited June
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and the responsibilities and penalties that go along with that it, may make
the burden seem reasonable. But, if a practical alternative exists that would
remove that burden from the individual taxpayer while generating
progressively comparable revenue amounts, failing to make the transition
would instead seem reasonably unfair.
This article proposes the graduated consumption tax model may be
such an alternative.11

Designed primarily to relieve the individual

taxpayer’s filing burdens while progressively generating sufficient
governmental revenue at comparable rates, the graduated consumption tax
model imposes differential tax rates on the consumption of all goods and
services, both at the production and retail levels. The rate attached to each
good or service would depend on the item’s character – whether it was a
“necessity” or a “luxury.” The items characterized as most necessary would
be assessed at the lowest tax rates while those characterized as most
luxurious would be assessed at the highest. All other consumables would
be taxed at a rate somewhere in between.

2, 2006).
11
While focusing principally on tax policy, it is essential to note that this article is
largely, if not entirely, heuristic. This article is an unrestrained experiment in thought; it is
not intended to be taken as quantitative, technical proof that any of its suggestions,
arguments, hypotheses, or assumptions is true. Admittedly, the graduated consumption tax
model raises far more pragmatic questions and concerns than it answers. But there is a
method to the madness. By approaching these questions from an outsider’s perspective,
this article offers a radical alternative to force an honest evaluation of the shortcomings of
the present income tax system, the circumstances where the proposed alternative could
actually work, and the policies that could serve as the inspiration for replacing the income
tax or finally enacting some meaningful change.
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This article consists of six parts.

The first part introduces and

outlines the graduated consumption tax proposal. Part II explores the major
proposed alternatives to the income tax, including some of the leading
scholarship, and compares some of the major features of these models
against the main features of the graduated consumption tax. This section is
not intended to serve as an exhaustive analysis or critique of the alternative
tax models. Rather, it is designed only to illustrate the major shortcomings
of the other tax alternatives that, among other things, fail ultimately to free
the individual taxpayer from the burden of tax collection, fail to generate
progressively sufficient revenue, or fail to do both.
Part III provides an illustrative model and the underlying theory of
the graduated consumption tax system and how it might be implemented.
Based on an expansion of Hobbesian foundational tax theory, the
illustrative model provides a six-tiered graduation ranging from items of
“Fundamental Necessity” to items of “Consummate Luxury.” Each tier is
assigned a specific number of internal steps assessed incrementally at
progressive tax rates. Characterization of items placed within each tier
would be determined as objectively as possible, employing a ranking
system based on a number of different quantitative and qualitative factors.
Part IV identifies and examines some of the potential benefits of the
graduated consumption tax model, including greater perception of fairness;

6
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the encouragement of responsible spending and savings; greater taxpayer
participation; decreased tax evasion and avoidance; greater capital surplus;
and lower interest rates, among several others.

Conversely, Part V

identifies and examines some of its potential weaknesses, including the
theoretical and factual problems inherent with item characterization, as well
as concerns with the model’s potential administration, equity, and economic
efficiency. This part concludes that each of these concerns must be tested
successfully before implementation of the model becomes possible.
Finally, Part VI considers briefly the constitutional implications of
replacing the existing income tax system with a graduated consumption tax
model. Although there may be some direct tax implications related to
possible transition relief, this part concludes that the graduated consumption
tax would be constitutional because it is, essentially, a classic indirect sales
tax.

I. OVERVIEW OF THE GRADUATED CONSUMPTION TAX PROPOSAL

The graduated consumption tax imposes differential tax rates on the
consumption of all goods and services at the production and retail levels.12
Although the design of the graduated consumption tax is intended primarily
to relieve the individual taxpayer’s filing burdens, the design also addresses
12

The graduated consumption tax model is debuted in this article as the offspring of
the author’s imagination.
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the three legs of traditional tax policy. Administrative efficiency is served
because a tax on consumption would relieve the filing burden from the
individual taxpayer. Equity is preserved because differential rates would
avoid regressivity. Finally, economic efficiency is facilitated because the
comprehensive tax base would ensure the generation of revenue amounts
comparable to the income tax system.
Nevertheless, proposing an income tax alternative is nothing new.
In fact, numerous alternative tax models, some of which are quite popular,
already exist. Yet, none of them proposes to remove the taxpayer’s filing
burden while progressively generating tax revenue in amounts comparable
to the present income tax system. The graduated consumption tax model is
the only one to propose broad-based consumption at multiple or differential
tax rates at the production and retail levels.
Although other models seem to disfavor the use of differential tax
rates,13 multiple rates are at the heart of the graduated consumption tax
model.

While more administratively complicated than the single-rate

alternatives, differential tax rates are critical for the graduated consumption
tax model because they are necessary to free completely individual
taxpayers from the burdens of tax filing, while simultaneously preserving
tax progressivity.14
13
14

See, e.g., infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
The graduated consumption tax model is designed primarily to achieve three

8
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Under the graduated consumption tax model, the differential tax

rates would vary according to the degree of necessity or luxury of the item
consumed. The less necessary – or more luxurious – an item is, the higher
the rate of tax would be placed on that item.15 The various rates of tax
would be compiled in an index of tax schedules that separates consumables
into a number of different categories based on their degree of necessity or
luxury. The rate represented in the schedule would not be a fixed dollar
amount but, rather, a percentage attached to the price of the item at the time
of purchase.16
Determining the degree of necessity or luxury of a given item, or its
character, would be a difficult task that would require some degree of value
judgment.17 Accurate characterization would be fundamental to the fair
application of a graduated consumption tax.18 Accurate characterization

purposes: (1) to remove individual taxpayer filing burdens; (2) to preserve tax
progressivity; and (3) to generate sufficient amounts of revenue at reasonable tax rates.
Incidentally, the author believes a “fair” tax is defined by these three principles. Cf. infra
note 40 and accompanying text.
15
Since the price of an item may vary by state or seller, the degree of necessity or
luxury ascribed to an item should not be purely a function of the market price of an item,
but a function of a number of different factors taken together. See infra note 19 and
accompanying text.
16
This method makes the graduated consumption tax uniformly applied throughout the
country, regardless of the possible variation in price of an item being sold in two or more
different states. Since the tax would be a percentage of the final purchase price, the same
proportionate amount of tax would apply.
17
Establishing an administrative agency competent to make transparently objective
determinations as to product character would be a vital component of a legitimate
graduated consumption tax model.
18
Legitimacy of the characterization process depends primarily on objectivity. The
characterization process may be susceptible to undue outside influence and political
pressure, all of which must be carefully monitored and controlled. See infra notes 112-13
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would require an objective examination of a number of different factors,
likely including the basic utility of the product; the price of the product
compared with the average market price of categorically similar items; the
degree of market finality of the product; the degree of market access and
demand; the degree of public benefit derived from the product; the novelty
of the product; and others.19
Although the graduated consumption tax model is designed to tax
consumption, as opposed to taxing income and savings, the primary purpose
of implementing a graduated consumption tax is to remove the burden of
computation and the liability of miscalculation from the individual
taxpayer.

Under the graduated consumption tax model, individual

taxpayers would not be required to compute or file anything when paying
their taxes. As with an ordinary sales tax, the tax they owe would be
computed directly and immediately into the sale of the products they
purchase.
The

graduated

consumption

tax

model

thus

employs

an

and accompanying text.
19
These factors are recommended and non-exhaustive. Some of the factors listed are
self-explanatory. Others might need some clarification. The degree of finality of the
product refers to a product’s placement within the stream of manufacturing. This factor
attempts to account for a component of the character of items sold by business entities that
are not producing the final version of the product ultimately consumed by the market at
large. For example, a product may pass through many different levels of manufacturing
before sold finally on the open market.
The novelty of the product encompasses two distinct concepts. First, whether the item
is new or used and, second, whether the item is one that is new to the market in general or
one that is a more familiar item. Such factors may be important factors to consider in the
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administrative framework similar to the credit-invoice value-added tax, as
sellers along the entire chain of production and distribution would be
required to keep accurate transaction records to make sure they are charging
and collecting the appropriate tax on each item they sell.20 And, since the
individual taxpayer would not file any paperwork, the only audits
performed by the government would be of the sellers.21
Although the filing burden of the individual taxpayer would be
removed, the graduated consumption tax model would not shift the overall
tax liability. Currently, the income tax system is itself progressive, placing
a greater tax burden on the wealthiest taxpayers.22 Since the design of the
graduated consumption tax is also progressive, it would achieve the same
results. Necessary items, such as food, clothing, housing, and medicine,
would be subject to little to no tax at all. All people, whether wealthy or
poor, are in equal need of a certain degree of these basic items.23
Conversely, luxury items such as yachts and private jets would be assessed

determination of an item’s character.
20
See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
21
The exception, of course, would be the informal or “backyard” seller, who would be
required to declare the sale on the appropriate form and file it with the agency which, in
turn, would assess the appropriate tax on the item and issue the bill to the purchasing
taxpayer for payment. See infra notes 116-17, 128 and accompanying text.
22
DOUGLAS A. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 1.1000 at 3-4 (Foundation Press 4th
ed. 1999); The Effects of Replacing Most Federal Taxes with a National Sales Tax: A Stateby-State Distributional Analysis, Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (“ITEP”), at 3
(Sept. 2005).
23
Practically speaking, degree may be a function of character. For example, staple
food items that one might find at most ordinary grocery stores should be subject to zero tax
liability. Meanwhile, gourmet items less necessary would be assessed appropriately at the
higher rates.
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properly at the highest tax rates.24
The graduated consumption tax system would impose an amount of
federal sales tax computed according to a sliding scale. The algorithm that
defines the scale might be summed up with one phrase: the greater the
luxury, the greater the tax. Thus, every consumable item would be placed
somewhere along this continuum according to its character and taxed
accordingly. And, since every consumable product or service would be
taxable, the graduated consumption tax would draw its revenue from a
virtually unrestricted tax base.25

Thus, unlike the other alternative tax

models, the large tax base would ensure progressive revenue generation
comparable to the income tax system without imposing unpalatably high tax
rates.26
The graduated consumption tax might be less complicated than the
income tax system.

Even if the system proves more administratively

complicated, those burdens would not be imposed on individual taxpayers
24

One of the fundamental challenges of the graduated consumption tax system would
be designating the relative necessity and the degree of luxury of any given item. In some
cases, the assessment should be relatively simple. For example, few could reasonably
argue that a 250-foot yacht or a Gulfstream V jet are items necessary to sustain only the
most basic level of human comfort. There are other situations, however, where assessment
would prove more difficult to determine. For example, it may be difficult to draw factual
or otherwise principled distinctions between items of the same general description. For
example, while shoes are clearly a necessity, Manolo Blahniks clearly are not. Likewise,
while houses may be necessary, mansions are not. While the foregoing examples may be
easy to distinguish, drawing close lines between different types of clothes, automobiles, or
homes, for example, may prove quite challenging. Navigating these dark waters would be
a necessary challenge of the graduated consumption tax system.
25
See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
26
See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text. Cf. infra note 75 and accompanying
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as they are presently under the income tax system. Individual taxpayers
would not be responsible for knowing the tens of thousands of pages of
rules or be required to fill out any paperwork based on those rules. Instead,
as with any sales tax, the taxes they owe would be calculated at the time of
purchase and attached to the bill of sale. The only thing the individual
taxpayers would be required to do is pay that bill.27

II. FRAMING THE GRADUATED CONSUMPTION TAX PROPOSAL

Calculating income tax liability is not a simple task. The income tax
system encumbers all taxpayers with the responsibility of sifting through
the tens of thousands of pages of tax codes and filing instructions,
computing tax liability based on equations and tables that are not always
easy to understand, filling out and filing all the proper forms and schedules
correctly, and making the appropriate payments.28 As if calculating tax
liability were not challenging enough, the government may impose

text.
27

Of course, taxpayers would have access to the character index and schedules of tax
rates. In addition, merchants would be required to post the applicable tax rate to the items
they were selling, giving notice to the buyer of the tax rate attached to the sale price.
28
These responsibilities, which this article refers to as the taxpayer’s “filing burdens,”
are quite significant. In fact, the IRS estimates the average taxpayer, using a tax software
program, takes about forty hours to figure out her taxes. David Keating, A Taxing Trend:
The Rise in Complexity, Forms, and Paperwork Burdens, NTU Policy Paper 120 (Apr. 17,
2006). The number of hours doubles to over eighty if the taxpayer is self-employed. Id. A
Tax Foundation study estimated that “[i]n 2005 individuals, business and non-profits
[spent] an estimated 6 billion hours complying with the federal income tax code, with an
estimated compliance cost of over $265.1 billion.” Moody, supra note 7, at 1. For a
comprehensive discussion of the other various forms of income tax burdens, see JAMES L.
PAYNE, COSTLY RETURNS: THE BURDENS OF THE U.S. TAX SYSTEM (1993) (pointing out,
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potentially severe penalties for failing to compute or file taxes correctly.29
Requiring flawless income tax computation requires a significant amount of
skill that even tax experts have difficulty achieving.30 Yet, the government
assumes that each taxpayer has the ability and the means to do the job.
Shouldering the monumental responsibility of “getting it right”
effectively requires the taxpayer to become relatively well-versed in tax
law.

But, it seems unreasonable to assume that most taxpayers have

mastered the over 60,000 pages of tax code and over 500 forms.31 Not

among other things, that it costs about $65 to raise $100 under the income tax system)
29
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6651, 6662, 6702 (2005). In criminal tax cases, the prosecution
must prove that the tax evasion was willful. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201
(1991) (“Willfulness, as construed by our prior decisions in criminal tax cases, requires the
Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant
knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty. . . . In such a
case, if the Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the
prosecution, without more, has satisfied the knowledge component of the willfulness
requirement. But carrying this burden requires negating a defendant's claim of ignorance of
the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law, he had a good-faith belief
that he was not violating any of the provisions of the tax laws.”).
30
The United States Government Accountability Office found that virtually all the
chain tax preparers it studied made significant errors in tax filing and calculation. U.S.
Gen. Accounting Office, Paid Tax Return Preparers, In a Limited Study, Chain Preparers
Made Serious Errors 14, (GAO-06-563T, Apr. 2006) (“All 19 of our visits to tax return
preparers affiliated with chains showed problems. Nearly all of the returns prepared for us
were incorrect to some degree, and several of the preparers gave us very bad tax advice . . .
. While some errors had fairly small tax consequences, others had very large tax
consequences. Incorrectly reported refunds ranged from refunds overclaimed by nearly
$2,000 to underclaims of over $1,700.”). See also David Keating, A Taxing Trend: The
Rise in Complexity, Forms, and Paperwork Burdens, NTU Policy Paper 120 (Apr. 17,
2006). (“The Tax Code is so convoluted that no one inside or outside of the IRS
understands it. For many years Money magazine’s annual test of tax preparers for a
hypothetical household proved that paid professionals often make huge mistakes. In 1998,
the last year Money administered the test, all 46 tested tax professionals got a different
answer, and not one got it right. The pro who directed the test admitted ‘that his
computation is not the only possible correct answer’ since the tax law is so murky. The tax
computed by these pros ‘ranged from $34,240 to $68,912.’ The closest answer still erred
in the government’s favor by $610.”).
31
Absurdly, taxpayers are expected to know more about the over 7 million words of
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surprisingly, many taxpayers delegate that responsibility to paid income tax
professionals.32

Meanwhile, immediate and significant inequities

reverberate as the government continues to force taxpayers to calculate their
own tax liabilities.33
As a result of its own unyielding complication, the income tax
system often creates unnecessary and unintended tax breaks, or
“loopholes.”34

Of course, in order to take advantage of a loophole, a

taxpayer must first know how to find one and properly utilize it. Naturally,
then, the benefits of these loopholes are enjoyed almost exclusively by the

tax rules than those who are paid to give tax advice at the IRS assistance centers. John
Semmens, Tax Filing Burden Continues to Grow, The Heartland Institute (Apr. 8, 2005)
(“In 2002, government auditors found IRS taxpayer assistance centers give the wrong
advice for filling out forms a distressingly large 50 percent of the time. Taxpayers’ distress
is intensified by the IRS’s refusal to stand by the advice it gives out. Taxpayers are not
relieved of any penalties they may face for errors on their tax forms resulting from
following the advice given by the IRS assistance centers.”).
32
According to the 2006 Tax Foundation Survey of U.S. Attitudes on Taxes and
Wealth (Q735), thirty-six percent of those surveyed indicated they paid an outside tax
professional to prepare their income taxes. This figure may be largely understated
according to a National Taxpayers Union policy paper written by David Keating that, citing
to the revised March 17, 2006 Taxpayer Usage Report of the IRS, indicates over sixty
percent of tax returns have been signed by paid preparers since 2004. David Keating, A
Taxing Trend: The Rise in Complexity, Forms, and Paperwork Burdens, NTU Policy Paper
120 (Apr. 17, 2006). That figure jumps to an astounding ninety percent when counting
computer-prepared returns. Id. The policy paper also indicated that the average fee
charged by H&R Block in 2006 for income tax preparation was around $150. Id.
33
The brunt of these inequities falls on the backs of the poor. “When examined by
income level, compliance cost is found to be highly regressive, taking a larger toll on lowincome taxpayers as a percentage of income than high-income taxpayers. On the low end,
taxpayers with adjusted gross income (AGI) under $20,000 incur a compliance cost equal
to 5.9 percent of income while the compliance cost incurred by taxpayers with AGI over
$200,000 amounts to just 0.5 percent of income.” Moody, supra note 7, at 1.
34
For example, a recent clarification in tax law intended to benefit the poor
inadvertently created a tax loophole for the rich. Mary Beth Franklin, Behold, A Tax
Loophole, Kiplinger.com article (Jan. 6, 2006) (“Thanks to a recent tax simplification law
designed to clarify who can claim a child as a dependent, some upper-income families with
both younger children and older “boomerang” kids living at home could benefit from an
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well-off or the well-advised.35 Successfully utilizing these loopholes,

36

those with the greatest tax burdens are able to shirk the full extent of their
intended tax liability, thereby shifting a greater proportionate burden onto
the backs of the less-than-wealthy.

Unfortunately, taming the current

income tax system has proven a Sisyphean task, as attempts to close
loopholes often result in the generation of others eager to take their place.37

A. The Usual Suspects: Major Income Tax Alternatives

The fundamental principles of tax policy are regarded as virtually
universal.38

Most agree that a “fair” tax should generate sufficient

governmental revenue while imposing acceptably minimum burdens on the
taxpayer.39 The form that best achieves those functions, however, enjoys

unintended loophole.”).
35
The irony is that many loopholes are the result of tax law designed to benefit the
poor, who are neither well-off nor can afford to be well-advised. See, e.g., supra note 34
and accompanying text.
36
Loophole generation may be the result of earnest attempts to immortalize an
outdated income taxation system that is far beyond its natural life expectancy. Although
tax rules and exceptions were created originally to achieve fairness, they have transformed
initially common-sense income tax principles into a nonsensical, dizzying mess. See infra
notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
37
See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
38
Graetz, supra note 3, at 273 (“The tax system can, and should, be fixed without such
a shift in the nation's tax burdens. As the conservative New York Times columnist William
Safire, who called the flat tax ‘draconian,’ has said, ‘Most of us accept as ‘fair’ this
principle: The poor should pay nothing, the middlers something, the rich the highest
percentage.’”).
39
William G. Gale, Tax Reform in the Real World, 15 Yale J. on Reg. 387, 391 (1998)
(reviewing MICHEAL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX (1997))
(“There is broad agreement, in principle at least, on the characteristics of a good tax: It
should raise sufficient revenue to finance government and it should be simple, fair, and
economically efficient.”).
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significantly less consensus.40 Indeed, disagreement existed even at the
beginning of the twentieth century, when the income tax system was finally
and formally adopted in the United States.41
However the income tax may be characterized presently, it was not
designed to be draconian. Nor was it perceived as such – well, at least not
until more recently.42 But, present frustration may have been unavoidable.
The country’s expanding sophistication eventually outgrew the capabilities
of the income tax system’s original design. To keep pace, the tax code also
grew, increasing in complexity to accommodate the changing needs of
society. Cannibalized by its own reforms, about six decades later, the
income tax code is now a hopeless, quixotic mess.43 Sadly, the mess is an
unintended consequence of obdurate efforts to mend a broken system and
the unwillingness to admit that it is beyond repair.44
The solutions presented to address the problems of the income tax

40

Id. (“In practice, there is probably less agreement on what some of these principles
mean; fairness, for example, is generally in the ‘eyes of the beholder.’ In addition, extreme
disagreement exists about the relative value of each of these characteristics and about how
they should be traded off one another.”).
41
See generally Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1
(1999) (tracing the history of the direct tax clauses and the enactment of the Sixteenth
Amendment).
42
Michael Graetz has studied and written extensively about this shift in public
perception. “From the period immediately following World War II until 1972, the
American people viewed the income tax as the fairest tax in the nation. Since 1980, they
have consistently viewed it as the least fair.” Graetz, supra note 3, at 272.
43
Or, in the words of Michael Graetz, the tax code is a “horrible mess.” Id. at 282.
44
Almost tragically, even altruistic gestures of the government appear to have the
opposite effect. For example, the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 actually generated
more paperwork than existed before its implementation. See infra note 46 and
accompanying text.
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system are as numerous as the problems themselves.45 The most widely
recognized solutions suggest either broad reform of the extant income tax
system or scrapping the system altogether and starting from scratch.46
Regardless of whether the income tax places unconstitutional burdens on
the backs of the taxpayers, the idea of scrapping the current income tax
system, and the countless provisions of the Internal Revenue Code along
with it, has tantalized taxpayers and economists for some time.47 The most
seriously considered income tax alternatives include the value-added tax,
the flat tax, the personal consumption tax, and the national retail sales tax.48

1. The Value-Added Tax

The value-added tax (hereinafter the “VAT”) has essentially two

45

They may also be as numerous as the people who thought them up, as each taxpayer
seems to have her or his own preference of what to do with the income tax system. Indeed,
this article may be evidence only of the same.
46
“Simplifying” the income tax system was not the answer. Congress tried it twice
before – once in 1980 and again in 1995 – but the income tax system’s interminable
complexity proved too great a juggernaut. David Keating, A Taxing Trend: The Rise in
Complexity, Forms, and Paperwork Burdens, NTU Policy Paper 120 (April 17, 2006) (“In
an attempt to bring the paperwork burden under control, Congress passed the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 . . . . [T]he law has been a failure, largely due to the increasing
burdens at the IRS.”) This article presumes the current income tax system may be
incapable of any meaningful reform. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
47
See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV.
961, 961 (1992) (“For over a century, tax scholars and economists have debated the merits
of replacing the existing income tax with a tax on consumption.”).
48
See generally U.S. Gen. Accounting Office (“GAO”), Tax Administration, Potential
Impact of Alternative Taxes on Taxpayers and Administrators 55-188 (GAO/GGD-98-37,
Jan. 1998) (presenting analysis on the national sales tax model), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98037.pdf (last visited June 30, 2006).
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forms, the credit-invoice VAT and the subtraction VAT.49 Both forms of
the VAT are designed to tax the value a business adds to a product at the
time of sale.50

What distinguishes the two forms is the method of

calculating the tax liability. Under the credit-invoice method, the tax is
calculated on each individual transaction at the time of sale.51 Under the
subtraction method, by comparison, the tax is calculated by subtracting the
business’s aggregate purchases of goods and services from other businesses
from the aggregate sales of its own goods and services.52
Tax liability is easier to verify under the credit-invoice VAT
because individual transactions can be traced and authenticated by
comparing the receipts and records of the businesses and individuals
involved at any point in the production chain, including the retail level.53
Because of this inherent verifiability, the credit-invoice VAT could impose
tax at multiple rates.54 Conversely, tax liability under the subtraction VAT
is difficult to verify because it would be based solely upon the business’s
49

Id. at 127.
The value added to a product by a business equals the difference between the
amount a business spent purchasing the product and the amount for which the same
business sold that product. Id.
51
Id. at 127, 133.
52
Id. at 127, 145.
53
Id. at 136, 146. See also U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Tax Policy, Choosing
Among Consumption Taxes 13 (GAO/GGD-86-91, Aug. 1986) (“The invoice method
allows for a readily administrable verification of tax liability because each business must
keep accurate records of total tax paid and charged, with supporting invoices. The trail of
invoices also allows cross-checking for accuracy should the business be selected for
audit.”), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d4t4/131062.pdf (last visited July 18, 2006).
54
The GAO notes that a single rate would be administratively more desirable. GAO,
supra note 48, at 134.
50
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own records, which cannot be cross-referenced against the records of other
businesses to verify their accuracy.55

Accordingly, to minimize

underreporting, the subtraction VAT should be assessed only at a single
rate.56
Both forms of the VAT eliminate the individual taxpayer filing
burdens.57 Rather than place the filing burden on the individual taxpayer,
the VAT places that burden on businesses, which would be required to
remit the difference between the taxes paid on its purchases of goods and
services and the taxes received on the sales of its own goods and services.58
Even though the burden of remitting taxes would be placed on businesses,
the burden of ultimately paying the taxes would be passed on entirely to the
individual taxpayer.59 And, while the credit-invoice VAT is commonly

55

Id. at 146.
Id.
57
Id. at 127.
58
Id.
59
Businesses do initially remit some portion of the taxes, but they eventually receive a
credit for the amount they pay. “Under [the credit-invoice VAT], for every sale within the
production and distribution system, a tax is calculated, added to the price of the product,
and shown on the invoice that sellers in these countries normally are required to furnish to
purchasers. At the end of each tax period, a business subtracts the sum of the taxes that it
paid on its purchases from the taxes that it collected on its sales. The difference is its net
tax liability, which it remits to the government. . . .
“An example may help to clarify how the invoice method works. This example is of a
value-added tax of 20 percent applied to the production and distribution of baseball bats. A
tree farmer harvests an ash tree and sells it to a lumber yard for $5 per unit. This represents
the value added to the ash seedling by the farmer. The farmer adds $1 of tax to his price (20
percent of $5) and collects a total of $6 from the lumber yard. He remits $1 of tax to the
government. The lumber yard takes the $5 unit of ash, cuts it into rectangular prisms, and
sells them to the bat maker for $10 (another $5 being added m value by cutting the wood).
In addition to the $10, the bat maker pays $2 of tax. The lumber yard remits to the
government the difference between the total amount of tax it collected ($2) from the sale of
its product and the total amount of tax it paid ($1) for raw materials. If audited, the lumber
56
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employed by many industrialized countries,60 it is often supplemented with
some form of income tax because the system is unable to generate sufficient
revenue on its own because of its limited tax base.61

2. The Flat Tax

The flat tax would attach a single rate of tax to the wages of all

yard must be able to produce the invoice from the tree farmer showing the $1 tax paid to
support its claim for the $1 tax credit.
“The same procedures are followed by the wholesaler and retailer. The wholesaler
buys the bats for $20 plus $4 of tax and sells them to the retailer for $25 plus $6 of tax.
Eventually, the consumer buys the finished baseball bats from the retailer for $36 – $30 for
the bats and $6 for the value-added tax.
“A retail sales tax of 20 percent would generate the same tax revenue ($6), but the
responsibility for collecting the tax and remitting it to the government would belong to the
retailer alone. Under the value-added method, four businesses remit 1 dollar and one
business, the bat maker, remits 2 dollars of tax.” U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Tax Policy,
Choosing Among Consumption Taxes, supra note 53, at 13-14 (footnote omitted).
As the above example illustrates, the VAT system simply spreads the burden of
remitting the taxes among the businesses linked within the production and distribution
chains. Id. In the end, since each business would receive its credit, the retail consumer
would ultimately pay the entire amount of tax liability. Id.
60
GAO, supra note 48, at 133. See also id. at 131 (“In 1996, the standard VAT rates
in most of the world’s industrialized countries ranged between 15 and 25 percent. Most of
these countries had different rates for necessities and/or luxuries. Most of these countries
also relied on an income tax, as well as the credit VAT, for their revenues.”) (footnote
omitted).
61
Id. at 131, 133. The tax base is limited because businesses end up passing the tax
burden onto the individual taxpayer. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. The
graduated consumption tax model, by comparison, requires both individuals and businesses
to contribute to the tax base at the retail and production levels, respectively. See infra note
123 and accompanying text. Furthermore, given its constraints, “[i]f a credit VAT,
collected at the various stages of production and distribution (including retail), replaced the
income and employment taxes, the rate could be as high or higher than the common rates
of 15 to 25 percent currently in effect in industrialized countries.” Id. at 139 (citation
omitted). Given the comprehensive tax base of the graduated consumption tax, the average
mean tax rate could be as low as thirteen percent. See infra notes 140-48 and
accompanying text.
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individuals and businesses, regardless of income level.62 Since it would tax
only the accumulation of unsaved income, the flat tax is technically
considered a consumption tax.63 Technicalities aside, however, the flat tax
would be administratively similar to the income tax because it would
impose upon taxpayers analogous burdens of tax computation and filing.
For example, to counterbalance the inherent regressivity of the main feature
of the flat tax – its fixed rate – the General Accounting Office (hereinafter
“GAO”) concluded that “[i]ndividuals would be required to make the
calculations to determine deductions, and thus, properly claiming
dependents, which has proven troublesome in the current system, would
continue as a problem area.”64

3. The Personal Consumption Tax

The personal consumption tax is not designed to lighten the
individual taxpayer’s filing burdens.

The personal consumption tax is

similar to the present income tax, except that it would impose tax upon total
taxpayer consumption rather than income.65

62

Unlike the flat tax, the

The GAO’s analysis focused specifically on the Hall and Rabushka version of the
flat tax. GAO, supra note 48, at 157 (citing Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka, The Flat
Tax, 2nd ed. (1995)).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 157, 162.
65
Id. at 174 (“In general, under a personal consumption tax, taxpayers add up all the
funds they have received during the year and then deduct the amount they saved. The
remaining amount is a measure of the taxpayer’s spending on goods and services for
consumption over the year, and this amount is subject to tax.”).
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personal consumption tax would tax consumption at graduated rates based
on income status.66 But, like the flat tax, the personal consumption tax
would not remove the individual taxpayer’s filing burdens. In fact, it would
increase those filing burdens because it would require the taxpayer to add
their income and deduct their savings to compute their tax liability.67 Under
this tax model, taxpayers would not only have to calculate their total income
accurately, they would also have to save all their receipts and calculate their
expenses with equal precision.68

4. The National Sales Tax

On January 4, 2005, Congress introduced the latest version of a
national sales tax program.69 The bill was designed to replace the income
tax system with a national sales tax at a single, fixed rate.70 The national
sales tax model was both novel and controversial. Although the legislation
advertised an initial fixed tax rate of twenty-three percent,71 upon review,
the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy concluded that the national
sales tax program would actually require a single, fixed tax-exclusive rate
66

Id.
Id. at 174.
68
GAO, supra note 48, at 178, 180.
69
The Fair Tax Act of 2005, H.R. 25, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
70
H.R. 25 §§ 101, 201.
71
H.R. 25 § 201, ch. 1, § 101(b)(1). Note, the twenty-three percent rate is taxinclusive. William G. Gale, A Note on the Required Tax Rate in a National Retail Sales
Tax: Preliminary Estimates for 2005-2014, The Brookings Institution (Aug. 12, 2004),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/gale/20040812.htm (last visited June
67
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somewhere between forty-five and sixty percent.72 In addition to the high
rate of taxation, the Institute found that a fixed-rate national sales tax would
shift the tax burden disproportionately to the low and middle-income
households:73 “As a result, replacing most federal taxes with a national
sales tax would mean very large tax increases on most Americans and very
large tax cuts for the wealthy.”74
The national sales tax model presented several other potential
problems. One such problem is that it purported to draw its revenue from a
reduced tax base.75 For example, under the national sales tax, business-tobusiness transactions would be exempted from taxation for fear of
cascading tax upon tax.76 Another significant problem with the national
sales tax model is due to its refunds and credit programs, which could

2, 2006).
72
ITEP, supra note 22, at 2 (citing William G. Gale, A Note on the Required Tax Rate
in a National Retail Sales Tax: Preliminary Estimates for 2005-2014, The Brookings
Institution (Aug. 12, 2004)).
73
Id. at 3.
74
Id.
75
The anemic tax base explains the exhorbitant tax rates under the national sales tax
model. Revenue-neutral tax rates (when compared to the income tax system) are possible
under the graduated consumption tax because of its significantly broader tax base. See
infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text. Perhaps the credit-invoice VAT or the national
retail sales tax might work better if their respective tax bases were simply broadened to tax
consumption along the entire production and distribution chains using the “consumption
events theory,” or something similar. Nevertheless, the theoretical considerations involved
in increasing the tax base under either of those models may result in a tax model very
similar to the graduated consumption tax.
76
H.R. 25 § 201, ch. 2. See also William G. Gale, The Required Tax Rate in a
National Retail Sales Tax, 52 NAT’L TAX JOURNAL 443, 445 (Sept. 1999) (“In a pure retail
sales tax, business-to-business transactions would not be included either, because the
purchase is used as an input, not as household consumption. . . . Thus, business purchases
would not enter the net tax base, . . . .”). But, note, the graduated consumption tax base is
configured under a different theory of consumption. See infra note 123 and accompanying
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facilitate increased tax avoidance and evasion.77 Finally, and significantly,
while the national sales tax model would reduce the individual taxpayer
filing burden, it would not eliminate it. Indeed, some taxpayer work would
still be required, especially for the poor who would still be required to file
forms to qualify for tax refunds or credits.78

B. The Other Players: Income Tax Alternatives Proposed by Scholars

Although the graduated consumption tax is novel, it is not the first
scholastic attempt to reform the income tax system. In fact, several scholars
have already proposed noteworthy income tax alternatives.

One such

scholar, Professor Michael Graetz, has proposed a sophisticated alternative
tax model that also seeks to remove the filing burdens from the majority of
individual taxpayers by combining essentially a single-rate VAT-style
consumption tax with reduced income taxes, payroll tax withholdings, and
corporate taxes.79 The Graetz model, however, would not eliminate entirely

text.
77

Gale, supra note 76, at 451 (warning that individuals might attempt to register as
business entities to take advantage of the tax credits).
78
For example, under the Fair Tax Act of 2005, taxpayers must apply for exemptions
and credits. See, e.g., H.R. 25 § 201, ch. 3 § 304. By comparison, the graduated
consumption tax model does not require the ordinary taxpayer to request or provide any
paperwork. From the consumer’s point of view, the transaction would function no
differently than the sales taxes most states currently employ. Unlike the Fair Tax Act of
2005, the individual taxpayer has no tax computation burdens under the graduated
consumption tax model because the exemptions and refunds would be built into the tax rate
calculations themselves
79
Graetz, supra note 3, at 285-99.
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the individual taxpayer filing burdens.80 Moreover, administrative concerns
aside, the graduated consumption tax presents a less complicated overall
design than the sophisticated Graetz model, which fuses several different
tax structures into a single patchwork.81
Also noteworthy is the “X-Tax.” Designed by Professor David
Bradford, the X-Tax is another sophisticated tax model alternative that
essentially couples a business tax with a graduated tax on employment
compensation.82 Because of its complicated design, and since the X-tax is a
form of subtraction VAT, administration of the tax may prove
challenging.83 Most significantly, however, the X-Tax would not relieve
individual taxpayer filing burdens, as it is contemplated to work in
conjunction with the present income tax system.84
Offering perhaps the most practical solution to address the growing
problem of individual income taxpayer filing burdens, Professor Joseph
Bankman introduced a pilot program called “ReadyReturn.”85 The program
would require California’s Franchise Tax Board to complete the taxpayer’s

80

Id. at 295 (explaining that, under his plan, “only about 25 million income tax returns
would be filed each year”).
81
See id. at 285-99.
82
David F. Bradford, What are Consumption Taxes and Who Pays Them?, Tax Notes,
Apr. 18, 1988, at 384, available at LEXIS 39 Tax Notes 383.
83
See id. at 387; cf. supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
84
Bradford, supra note 82, at 385 (“The X-Tax could be administered in conjunction
with the existing income tax.”).
85
Joseph Bankman, Simplifying the Tax System for Average Citizens: the California
“ReadyReturn,”
Tax
Notes
(forthcoming),
available
at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/faculty/bankman/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2006).
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state income tax return using the wage data it already receives from
employers.86 Upon review, the taxpayer can accept the government’s work,
make changes to it, or fill out and file a new return entirely on their own.87
While the “ReadyReturn” program is a thoughtful and efficient
approach to relieving the individual taxpayer’s filing burdens,88 it presents
its own shortcomings. As an initial matter, the “ReadyReturn” program
appears to be based on the ideal notion that there is one correct way, or at
least one “most” correct way, for taxpayer’s to calculate their individual tax
liabilities.89

Unfortunately, the reality is that the income tax’s

overwhelming complexity now allows for significant computational
variance within individual tax returns.90 Perhaps anticipating this problem,
the “ReadyReturn” would be offered only to those who ordinarily file the
simplest returns, leaving the overwhelming majority of the taxpaying
population – including those with the most complicated returns and, in turn,
the most onerous filing burdens – no better off than they were before.91
86

Id. at 3.
Id.
88
To its credit, the “ReadyReturn” program achieves the same primary purpose of the
graduated consumption tax model without requiring a complete change of the extant
income tax system.
89
“The ReadyReturns stated the wage income reported to the State, and the tentative
tax liability produced by that wage income.” Id. at 3. The inference drawn from this
statement, as well as the impetus behind the program itself, is that the filing burden is
simply a matter of math, work, and time. But, as any taxpayer might attest, filing taxes is
never that simple. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
90
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
91
“The California Franchise Tax Board, or FTB, has come up with a plan that would
greatly simplify tax return filing for over 3 million Californians. These citizens have only
wage income, and do not itemize deductions.” Joseph Bankman, ReadyReturn: A Brief
87
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Moreover, there is a good chance that the taxpayers who would
actually benefit from the program might be overcharged by the government,
as even tax experts seem incapable of taming the tax code’s complexity.92
As a result, and quite understandably, Professor Bankman speculates that
some

taxpayers

would

nevertheless

prefer

to

double-check

the

government’s work by doing it themselves, using a software program, or
even submitting their returns to their tax preparer.93
So, as thoughtful and efficient as the “ReadyReturn” program
appears, it can hardly be considered a comprehensive solution when it
seems that over ninety percent of taxpayers will be excluded from the
program,94 and when some of the taxpayers who actually participate would
do the work the “ReadyReturn” program was designed to eliminate
anyway.95 And, even if the “ReadyReturn” program eliminated the filing
burden to an extent comparable to the graduated consumption tax model, it
would do so without the model’s added administrative benefits since, like

Explanation, The California ReadyReturn Project, at 1, available at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/faculty/bankman/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2006). According to
the latest census information, which estimated California’s population in 2005 at
36,132,147, the “ReadyReturn” program would appear to help less than ten percent of
Californians. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts, California State Quick
Facts Table, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html (last visited
Aug. 3, 2006).
92
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
93
“Some taxpayers would be thrilled to simply have a return to sign; others would
want to show the Ready Return to their preparer, run the return through Turbo Tax or other
software, or ‘manually’ double-check the State’s numbers.”
Joseph Bankman,
ReadyReturn: A Brief Explanation, The California ReadyReturn Project, at 1, available at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/faculty/bankman/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2006).
94
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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the credit-invoice VAT, fewer entities would be responsible for filing taxes
under the graduated consumption tax model.96 Indeed, Professor Bankman
and Professor David A. Weisbach have previously argued, quite
persuasively in fact, that an ideal consumption tax should be preferred over
an ideal income tax for a host of reasons.97

Thus, if the graduated

consumption tax can achieve the goals of the “ReadyReturn” program with
equal or better administration, equity, and economic efficiency, then
perhaps it too should be preferred.

III. THE GRADUATED CONSUMPTION TAX MODEL

While the graduated consumption tax is envisioned as a complete
replacement to the income tax system, it could also function as an income
tax supplement.

In fact, the European VATs, as well as many other

proposed income tax alternatives, are designed to supplement and not to

95

See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
Under a credit-invoice VAT, only sellers – not consumers – would be responsible
for filing taxes. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
97
Professors Bankman and Weisbach provide many persuasive reasons for resetting
some of the traditional notions that favor an income tax over a consumption tax. Joseph
Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over an
Ideal Income Tax 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006), also available at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/faculty/bankman/TheSuperiority.pdf (last visited Aug. 4,
2006). Among those reasons, unlike the income tax, a consumption tax would not distort
savings decisions. Id. at 1422. In addition, a consumption tax would generate greater
efficiency. Id.at 1455; cf. infra notes 184-94. Professors Bankman and Weisbach based
their study on the assumption that a consumption tax should be neutral, or that it taxes all
consumption at the same rate. Id. at 1414. Obviously, the graduated consumption tax does
not follow the same assumption.
96
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replace the income tax.98 But, the graduated consumption tax model does
not contain the same design limitations as the European VATs. Unlike the
European VATs, the graduated consumption tax would not need
supplementation because it would generate sufficient amounts of revenue
on its own.99 Moreover, given the mess associated with any degree of
income tax filing, the graduated consumption tax must completely replace
the present income tax if it is to accomplish its primary goal of removing all
the individual taxpayer’s filing burdens. Thus, there would be no need or
reason to endure the administrative or economic headaches associated with
keeping the income tax, even if reduced to some supplementary form.
Accordingly, like the Fair Tax Act of 2005,100 the graduated
consumption tax model would replace completely not only the income tax,
but also the payroll and estate and gift taxes.101 In addition, the repeal of
the 16th Amendment would be appropriate. Excise taxes, however, should
remain unchanged, as their continued presence would have no effect on the
individual taxpayer except to increase the tax base and, in turn, decrease the

98

See GAO, supra note 48, at 133; Graetz, supra note 3, at 285-99.
See infra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
100
The Fair Tax Act of 2005 was introduced in the House of Representations on
January 4, 2005, by Mr. Linder on behalf of himself and Mr. DeLay, Mr. Brady of Texas,
Mr. Culberson, Mr. Deal of Georgia, Mr. Flake, Mr. Gutknecht, Mr. King of Iowa, Mr.
Kingston, Mr. Westmoreland, and Mr. Price of Georgia. H.R. 25.
101
Cf. H.R. 25 § 101-03. In addition, the graduated consumption tax model may adopt
the Congressional Findings related to the income, payroll, estate and gift taxes as well. See
H.R. §§ 2(a) – (c).
99
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tax rates.102
Functionally, the graduated consumption tax would operate like a
national sales tax at both the production and retail levels.103 While the
design of the graduated consumption tax model is similar to that of the Fair
Tax Act, it differs significantly from the Act in that the tax rates under the
graduated consumption tax model vary progressively in relation to the
character of the specific item being consumed. Accordingly, under the
graduated consumption tax model, credit, refunds, and allowances would be
unnecessary because they would be built into the progressive nature of the
tax rates themselves.104 And, since there would be no exceptions or
exemptions, all spending generated within the United States would be
subject to taxation under the appropriate classification,105 including
interstate and international purchases.106

102

Cf. H.R. 25 § 104.
The graduated consumption tax model may incorporate some or all of Congress’s
findings relating to an administration of a national sales tax with the exception, of course,
that the national sales tax rates should be graduated according to the character of necessity
or luxury associated with each particular item taxed and should include a broader tax base.
See H.R. 25 §§ 2(d) & (e).
104
Cf. H.R. 25 § 201, chs. 2 & 3.
105
All items consumed shall be subject to tax. While the purchase of homes would be
subject to tax at the appropriate rate corresponding to the characterization of the home, an
interesting question is whether rent should also be taxed. Technically, the act of paying
rent is a form of consumption; accordingly, it seems logical to conclude that rent should be
subject to tax. While the transaction would be subject to tax assessment, the tax rate
associated with the rent would likely be de minimis, as the majority of rent would probably
be characterized as a necessity. Naturally, the character of rent payments would
correspond largely to the character of the item upon which the rent would be based.
106
This policy would eliminate some of the benefits of off-shore accounts. Since there
would be no income tax advantage to holding assets outside of the United States, many of
those assets may find their way back home into the U.S. Furthermore, since all
103
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A. The Characterization Model
Like the income tax system,107 the graduated consumption tax model
is progressively designed.108 Under the graduated consumption tax model,
tax rates may be organized into graduated tiers.

The tax rates would

increase progressively from one tier to the next. An illustration of the tax
rates109 under a graduated consumption tax model is provided below:
Tax Tier

Tax Range

Fundamental Necessity

0% Sales Tax

Moderate Necessity

0-4% Sales Tax

Marginal Necessity

5-9% Sales Tax

consumption within the United States would be subject to tax – even the consumption of
international goods and services – there would be no tax benefit to purchasing products
from off-shore entities.
107
KAHN, supra note 22, § 1.1000 at 3-4.
108
The term “progressive” is used carefully here. In the income tax sense,
“progressive” means the tax burden increases along with income, ensuring a greater tax
burden supported by the wealthy. For the graduated consumption tax model, the term
“progressive” must have a technically different meaning, even if its impact is practically
the same. Under the graduated consumption tax model, the tax burden would increase
along with consumption. Thus, the greatest tax burden would be supported by the most
excessive, lavish, and decadent consumers. In virtually all cases, the most decadent
consumers are also those with the greatest spending power. Thus, while the “progressive”
nature of the consumption tax technically targets excessive consumption, like the income
tax system, the greatest tax burden, practically speaking, would also be borne by the most
wealthy.
109
Here, the tax rates were intended to be tax-exclusive. Whether the graduated
consumption tax model ultimately utilizes tax-inclusive or tax-exclusive percentages is
largely an irrelevant matter of semantics. Nevertheless, to avoid any possible confusion,
the graduated consumption tax model should utilize only one or the other and broadcast its
choice clearly to the public.
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Marginal Luxury

10-25% Sales Tax

Moderate Luxury

33-67% Sales Tax

Consummate Luxury

67%-100% Sales Tax

Under this model, every consumable item would be taxed according
to the rate that corresponds to the item’s character. Each tier could be
further subdivided into a specific number of steps. Items could then be
classified according to their tier and their respective step within each tier.
Once classified, the appropriate tax rate would apply.
Tier
First Tier:
Fundamental Necessity
Second Tier:
Moderate Necessity
(1% Steps)

Third Tier:
Marginal Necessity
(1% Steps)

Degree

Tax Rate

(No subdivision)

0% Sales Tax

First Step

1% Sales Tax

Second Step

2% Sales Tax

Third Step

3% Sales Tax

Fourth Step

4% Sales Tax

First Step

5% Sales Tax

Second Step

6% Sales Tax

Third Step

7% Sales Tax

Fourth Step

8% Sales Tax

Fifth Step

9% Sales Tax
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Fourth Tier:
Marginal Luxury
(Three 1% Steps, Three
5% Steps)

Fifth Tier:
Moderate Luxury
(7% Steps)

Sixth Tier:
Commensurate
Luxury
(11% Steps)

First Step

10% Sales Tax

Second Step

11% Sales Tax

Third Step

12% Sales Tax

Fourth Step

17% Sales Tax

Fifth Step

22% Sales Tax

Sixth Step

27% Sales Tax

First Step

32% Sales Tax

Second Step

39% Sales Tax

Third Step

46% Sales Tax

Fourth Step

53% Sales Tax

Fifth Step

60% Sales Tax

First Step

67% Sales Tax

Second Step

78% Sales Tax

Third Step

89% Sales Tax

Fourth Step

100% Sales Tax

Due to the progressive nature of the graduated consumption tax
model, the rates between each step increase incrementally, with the slowest
increases in rate reserved for items characterized as more necessary and the
steepest increases in rate reserved for the items considered most luxurious.
For example, if the character of an item is classified within the fourth step
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of the tier of moderate luxury, then the item would be taxed at a rate of
fifty-three percent for the sale. Of course, the number of tiers, steps, and
rates – even the category labels – are intended to be illustrative only. The
actual number of tiers, steps, and rates must be calculated in a far less
arbitrary way.110
Determining the character of an item – its degree of necessity or
luxury – obviously requires the government to make certain value
judgments. These value judgments, however, can and must be made as
objectively as possible. The legitimacy of the graduated consumption tax
model, therefore, depends largely on a classification system that is
absolutely transparent. The transparency of the classification system would
help guarantee against arbitrary assignments or political influence, which
could quickly and easily discredit the system entirely.111

110

Given the low mean tax rates – a natural consequence of the comprehensive tax
base – the differential tax rates could conceivably cover a substantially smaller range than
provided in the above illustration. See infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
Moreover, a two or three-tiered system that distinguishes only between necessities and
luxuries, for example, could achieve the same goals of the graduated consumption tax
system, see supra note 13 and accompanying text, while posing simpler tax administration
issues than the six-tiered model.
In fact, similar models have already proven
administratively possible, as most of the countries that employ a VAT system of taxation
do so utilizing differential tax rates. GAO, supra note 48, at 131 (“Most of the[ ] countries
[using the VAT] had different rates for necessities and/or luxuries.”). For the sake of
clarity, however, the more complicated six-tiered model is offered here only for the sake of
theoretical completeness.
111
A potential weakness inherent in the graduated consumption tax model is that
businesses would likely mount overwhelming lobbying efforts in an attempt to influence
the characterization of their products and, hopefully, secure a lower tax rate. Of course,
political gerrymandering already affects the present tax code to some extent. Nevertheless,
transparency in this regard would be critical to preserving the fair application and
legitimacy of the graduated consumption tax model. Possible solutions may include
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No radical solution would be required to maintain transparency and
legitimacy; our current system of checks and balances is equipped to handle
the challenge.

Hence, like many other governmental programs, under

Congressional authority, the Executive Branch could create an independent
agency like the “State and Federal Cooperative Tax Administration”
identified in the Fair Tax Act,112 which would compile the various indexes,
classification tables, and corresponding tax schedules.

Predictably, the

work conducted by that agency, or any others, would be answerable to all
three branches of government.
While the model attempts to preserve fairly the progressive nature of
the current income tax system, the consumption tax model reflects a
different philosophy than the income tax system. Rather than tax income
progressively, which some may characterize as a system that “punishes”
hard work, the graduated consumption tax model is designed to tax
spending progressively.113

The policy behind the graduated consumption

tax model is not to tax income or savings but to tax all consumption at both
the production and retail levels.
Under this policy, individuals and entities alike would be subject to

prohibiting or restricting lobbying efforts or enacting an administrative agency whose sole
charge would be to regulate and scrutinize the legitimacy of the characterization processes.
112
See H.R. 25 § 201, ch. 4.
113
Some might characterize the graduated consumption tax model as one that
“punishes” spending. Due to its progressive nature, however, it would seem more accurate
to characterize the model as one that “punishes” excessive and extravagant spending rather
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the same tax rates. The amount of taxes either would pay, therefore, would
depend entirely on how much the taxpayer consumes and the character of
the items consumed. For example, although a manufacturer’s consumption
of raw materials would be subject to taxation, the level of taxation would
depend on the tax classification of raw materials consumed. In the case of
food manufacturers, for instance, aside from the tax rate attached to other
business consumption, the rate of tax that would apply either to the
purchase of raw materials or the sale of the finished food item would either
be zero or some percentage close to it.

Similarly, in the case of the

manufacturer of luxury items, raw materials would be taxed at a rate
significantly lower than the rate attached to the sale of the final product
manufactured using those raw materials.114
Since the graduated consumption tax would tax all consumption, the
tax would apply to the purchase of all items. An all-inclusive consumption
tax base, however, raises interesting questions, such as whether the policy
should apply a tax to the consumption of used products. The policy behind
implementing a graduated consumption tax does not necessarily need to

than spending in general.
114
Characterization – the degree of “necessity” or “luxury” associated with an item –
is not measured subjectively in terms of the necessity of using any particular raw material
for production or consumption. Rather, “necessity” is measured more objectively in terms
of whether the item being consumed, in abstraction, is something characteristically
luxurious or necessary when compared to similar or like-kind materials, goods, or services.
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distinguish between new and used products.115

In fact, the market

automatically corrects for any discrepancies in value and, since the tax rate
would be a percentage of the value, the actual amount of the tax would be
reduced in direct proportion to the discounted value, if any, of the used
item.116
Still, under this policy, one may contend reasonably that no
consumption tax should attach to the sale of an unmodified,117 used product
because it has not changed character and the tax assessed on it, presumably,
has already been paid by the seller. In other words, once consumed, the
same item should not be taxed again. Ultimately, and as this introductory
question illustrates, developing a sound theoretical basis for the graduated
consumption tax is critical to its successful implementation.118

B. The Consumption Events Theory

As a matter of theory, consumption is sometimes considered to
occur exclusively outside the production cycle.119 Many tax models, such

115

As a matter of enforcement, it might prove practically useful to distinguish between
the commercial seller of used goods and the one-time backyard seller, as backyard sales are
typically hard to track. Cf. supra note 127 and accompanying text.
116
As a default, the character of the used item would be identical to when it was new.
Merchants, or backyard sellers, may request character re-evaluations by the appropriate
federal agency, however, to compensate for age, wear-and-tear, and similar considerations.
117
Theoretically, the example requires the product to be unmodified because the
character of an item must be reevaluated once modified.
118
See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
119
Some scholars note, however, the line between consumption and production is not
always clear. See Robin Cooper Feldman, Consumption Taxes and the Theory of General
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as the VAT, operate under a version of this theory of consumption.120
Under this definition, if a tax on consumption were imposed at each step in
the stream of commerce, from manufacturer to distributor to retailer, and if
the end-market consumer were paying a tax on an item that represents onehundred percent of the consumed value of the product, then the graduated
consumption tax model would impose a total tax on consumption that
would exceed the total consumed value of the product.
Viewing consumption as occurring exclusively outside the
production cycle, however, creates an overly broad distinction between
producers and consumers.121

Under a consumption tax that taxes only

consumers, the implication is that only consumers consume. Hence, the
theory infers, producers should not pay a consumption tax because they do
not consume.
consume.122

The inference, of course, is incorrect: producers also
The distinction, therefore, should not be drawn between

producers and consumers as a class but, rather, between the individual
events of production and consumption regardless of class.

and Individual Taxation, 21 VA. TAX REV. 293, 360 n.65 (2002) (“The definition of
consumption, however, views individual consumption in isolation from the production
cycle. It suggests that an individual's consumption has no productive element at all. This
implication is misleading in two respects. First, production and consumption are part of the
same economic cycle. . . . Second, it is artificial to suggest that an individual exhausts
resources solely for personal reasons and not in any way for the purpose of production. . . .
Individual consumption, however, cannot be neatly separated from the production cycle.”)
(citations omitted).
120
For an example of how this theory applies in the credit-invoice VAT context, see
supra note 59 and accompanying text.
121
See Feldman, supra note 119, at 360 n.65.
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Unlike the traditional theory of consumption, which assigns
consumption tax liability to a broad class of market-end consumers, the
“consumption events theory” instead views individual events to determine
when the consumption tax should apply. Taxing consumption at all levels –
whether production, distribution, or retail – the consumption events theory
distinguishes only between production and consumption events, taxing only
the latter. And, once identified, each consumption event is treated as an
isolated and complete consumption event.123
At the beginning of the stream of commerce, the manufacturer is
removing natural resources and transforming them into something novel.
This

transformative

event

is

theoretically

and

operationally

tax

significant.124 Once consumed, the old transforms into the new, and the
finished product becomes something separate and distinct from the raw
122

See id.
The “consumption events theory” is the author’s comprehensive expansion of
Hobbesian foundational tax theory tailored specifically to the characterization theories of
the graduated consumption tax model. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 266-67
(Clarendon Press 1958) (1651) (“[T]he Equality of Imposition consisteth rather in the
Equality of that which is consumed, than of the riches of the persons that consume the
same. For what reason is there, that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his
labour, consumeth little, should be more charged, than he that living idlely, getteth little,
and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more protection from the Common-wealth,
than the other?”). For a discussion on the Hobbesian foundational tax theory, see Fried
supra note 47, at 962, 996, 1006-07, 1016. “Under the Hobbesian view, a ‘fair tax’ is
defined simply as a tax that applies only to personal consumption.” Id. at 996.
124
A bright-line transformative event test would avoid over-complication of the
characterization models. Only significant changes in the physical structure or overall
design of the good or service should qualify for re-characterization. For example, if a
retailer assembles a box of parts into a functioning bicycle, a significant change has
occurred and re-characterization would be appropriate. By contrast, if a retailer simply
inserts a reflector in the spokes of a pre-assembled bicycle, a significant change has not
123
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materials used to create it. The characterization of the new product is a
reflection of that transformation. So, in this example, the tax assessed to the
consumption of raw materials under the consumption events theory would
represent 100 percent consumption of those materials. Under this theory,
once the new product assumes its new character, it would then be ready for
its own separate and complete consumption event.125
Returning to the introductory question,126 the consumption of used
items is treated no differently. If the used item is modified, its character has
changed, and it is ready for a subsequent sale that is an independent,
separate, and complete consumption event. The sale of the unmodified,
used item, however, requires more complicated considerations that could
follow one of two different approaches. The difference between the two
approaches depends on whether the original sale is regarded as a complete
or incomplete consumption event.
Under the first approach, the sale of the unmodified, used item

occurred and re-characterization would not be inappropriate. For a brief consideration of
the effect on middle-merchants, see infra note 133 and accompanying text.
125
The consumption events theory is similar conceptually to the biological food chain.
Once an item was consumed, the theory assumes it was completely removed from the
market, in essence, absorbed or digested by the consumer. Although any product
consumed subsequently may, in fact, be composed in part or entirely of the prior item
consumed, it would be treated as though something completely separate and independent
was consumed. All items sold are viewed similarly under the consumption events theory
theory, whether sold by one manufacturer to another for the purpose of completing an
unfinished product or sold by one consumer to another for the purpose of selling a used
item.
126
The introductory question is whether the consumption events theory should apply to
the sale of used products. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
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would generate no tax liability because its original consumption was
considered complete and, since it was unmodified, the item’s character did
not change. The second approach, conversely, views a subsequent sale as
an indication that its original consumption was incomplete. Accordingly,
the item would be subject to a subsequent consumption event because its
sale would indicate some consumable value in the product that was not
exhausted by its original purchase. Thus, under this view, the consumption
tax on the discounted price of the unmodified, used item may be justified
theoretically as the tax on consumption of that previously unrecognized
value.127
Regardless of which approach is adopted, the consumption events
theory would not cascade tax-upon-tax for the manufacturers and
distributors. By definition, cascading tax would not be possible under the
theory because each transaction along the chain of production would be
viewed as a separate, distinct, and complete consumption event.128
Moreover, the character of the item, and its corresponding tax rate, would
depend on where the product is found in the manufacturing process.129

127

Ultimately, the approach that is adopted should not have a significant impact on
revenue generation either way, as the sale of the unmodified, used item would occur almost
exclusively by the informal or “backyard” seller who, incidentally, probably does not claim
such sales as income under the present tax system. For the sake of simplicity and
consistent application among all sellers, both private and commercial, the latter approach
may be preferred.
128
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
129
Since the character of an item would change at each step in the manufacturing
process, the unmodified, used item-scenario would not apply to manufacturers. See supra
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Manufacturing profitability, therefore, would be preserved because the
earlier a product would be found in the manufacturing process, the more
necessary its character would be assessed at the time of consumption.
Hence, a manufacturer consuming raw materials would pay little tax while
the final consumer would pay the highest tax assessed respectively on that
product.130
Of course, cascading tax upon tax may be a larger problem for the
retailer or distributor who is simply reselling an otherwise finished
product.131

In this situation, the business entity makes an inaccessible

product readily available to the market. In addition to the degree of product
finality, market availability would be an inherent component of the finished
product.132 A product that is not readily available to the market is not in its
final, market-ready form until the moment when the market readily has
access to it. Accordingly, the finished character of the product should

notes 124-25 and accompanying text. The consumption events theory assumes that tax
rates may be assessed in a way that does not significantly encourage business entities to
vertically consolidate to avoid business-to-business consumption tax. In addition, this
theory of consumption assumes that the final market is that which the public at large
readily has access to, and that the tax rates may be assessed in a way that does not
significantly encourage end-market consumers to prefer the purchase of unfinished
products over finished products.
130
“Respectively highest tax assessed on that product” because the final, highest tax
assessed on that product would ultimately depend on that finished product’s final character.
Moreover, this analysis ignores price increases along the chain of production, which would
further insulate manufacturing profitability.
131
Some business entities may sell services in addition to products or services only.
Like tangible products, services are also consumable items subject to characterization and
the corresponding tax assessment.
132
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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reflect this value added by the retailer or distributor.133

IV. BENEFITS OF THE GRADUATED CONSUMPTION TAX MODEL

Assuming it can be implemented reasonably and generate sufficient
amounts of revenue, the benefits of the graduated consumption tax model
are exciting to imagine. The primary benefit of the graduated consumption
tax is that individual taxpayers would no longer be burdened with the
responsibility of calculating their own tax liabilities.134

Regardless of

whether the individual taxpayer’s burden of tax calculation is constitutional,
removing that burden – if possible – seems only fair.135

133

Incidentally, middle-merchants who simply pass wares already available on the
market without also providing services may add little, if any added value. In those
situations, it would be difficult if not impossible for such businesses to remain profitable
assuming, of course, that they were otherwise unable to increase the price of the item for
sale. Nonetheless, such middle-merchants subsist presently only at the needless expense of
the consumer. Keeping prices competitive would provide those previously exploited
consumers with more money to spend on other products. This inherent prophylactic
consequence of the graduated consumption tax model may thus represent a benefit to
consumers, their spending power, and the economy.
134
See supra notes 20, 27 and accompanying text.
135
The government bears the burden of calculating the appropriate tax rates. Like the
VAT, however, the burden of applying the appropriate rate and remitting taxes would also
fall on the backs of businesses under the graduated consumption tax since the two models
are based upon similar administrative frameworks. See supra note 20 and accompanying
text. Unfortunately, this burden is unavoidable, but businesses would be better suited to
bear this responsibility than would individual taxpayers.
Out of concern for the potentially disproportionate burden on small businesses,
“[m]ost European VATS were established with small business exemptions. Typically, in
countries with these VATS, small businesses do not have to file returns or remit tax if their
gross receipts are low, for example, less than $25,000 per year.” GAO, supra note 48, at
130. Exempting small businesses may also be a consideration for the graduated
consumption tax model, but only if granting the exemption would not significantly affect
the tax base. See infra notes 140-51 and accompanying text. Like the hypothetical U.S.
VAT, the treatment of small businesses under the graduated consumption tax model should
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Eliminating the income tax system would also reduce the large drain

on the economy attributed to the costs of filing and paying large lump-sum
amounts to the government every April 15.136 The graduated consumption
tax model would not only calculate tax liability and broadcast the exact
amount owed, but it would also allow taxpayers to spread their liability by
spending throughout the year. Without the drain caused by the excision of
lump sum payments and filing deadlines, taxpayers would be able to
manage their spending and saving more effectively.
Another benefit of the graduated consumption tax system would be
significantly greater participation from all consumers.137 On February 14,
2006, the IRS announced that it estimated a $345 billion tax gap for the
2001 tax year.138 As compared with the income tax, under the graduated

not be problem either way. Id. at 136 (“For example . . . 96 percent of income year 1993
corporate revenues came from only 2 percent of corporations. However, because most
small businesses at the retail level in the United States are familiar with remitting state and
local [retail sales taxes], small businesses may not need special treatment under a U.S.
VAT.”).
136
While the costs of compliance with the federal income tax are already exorbitant,
they are only increasing. A Tax Foundation study found that the estimated cost of
complying with the federal income tax code in 2005 totaled over $265.1 billion for
individuals, businesses, and non-profits. Moody, supra note 7, at 1. A similar study had
previously found that “the estimated cost of [federal income tax] compliance in 1999 was
over $125 billion.” J. Scott Moody, The Cost of Complying with the U.S. Federal Income
Tax, Tax Foundation Background Paper No. 35 at 9 (Nov. 2000), available at
http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/7eb3ef27926cd164a33e6bf5a46372c8.pdf (last visited
June 1, 2006). “Projections show that by 2015 the compliance cost will grow to $482.7
billion.” Moody, supra note 7, at 1.
137
Of course, tax evasion is a significant concern. Even so, participation under the
graduated consumption tax model should exceed the level currently enjoyed under the
income tax system. See infra notes 195-207 and accompanying text.
138
Press Release: IRS Updates Tax Gap Estimates (Feb. 14, 2006) (“The updated
estimate of the overall gross tax gap for Tax Year 2001 – the difference between what
taxpayers should have paid and what they actually paid on a timely basis – comes to $345
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consumption tax model, taxpayers would be less capable of hiding from
their tax burdens. Every person and entity must consume to survive, and
every consuming person or entity would pay their fair share of the taxes at
the same time.139
Under the graduated consumption tax model, all consumption events
would be taxable.140 The effective tax base, thus, would consist of personal
consumption expenditures and government141 and corporate expenditures,
including employment compensation.142 Greater taxpayer participation,143

billion.”), available at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=154496,00.html
(last visited June 2, 2006).
139
Like the credit-invoice VAT, the trail of invoices found along the production and
distribution chains would make tax liability difficult to avoid or evade under the graduated
consumption tax model. See infra notes 195-207 and accompanying text. Of course, since
everyone must pay the tax on the items they consume, foreigners or undocumented workers
spending time and money in the United States may also be required to pay consumption
taxes. Like everyone else, the share of consumption taxes paid by such persons would be a
function of the resources and governmental services enjoyed by that person in an amount
proportionate to the time spent and amount consumed while in this country.
140
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
141
Government spending would also be subject to tax to promote consistency and
simplicity in the application of the tax, which limits alternate routes for avoidance and
evasion, and also to promote government accountability. Like the ordinary consumer,
theoretically, forcing the government to pay taxes on its consumption may encourage it to
spend within its means.
142
Under the consumption events theory, employers are consuming the labor of their
employees. Accordingly, the salaries paid in exchange would be taxable to the employer as
consumption events. Rates would probably be low, however, as the consumption of most
labor would likely be characterized under independent schedules as more necessary than
luxurious. Note that employers already pay taxes on payroll under Subtitle C of the
Internal Revenue Code. The labor tax rate schedules under a graduated consumption tax
could be designed to impose no greater tax burden than already exists.
143
Under the graduated consumption tax model, taxpayer participation includes
undocumented workers and foreign visitors that consume resources within the United
States. An interesting question this article does not address, however, is whether the
consumption tax should be placed on items consumed in the United States from purchasers
abroad. For the sake of theoretical consistency, simplicity, and the protection against tax
avoidance, the tax should apply to the consumption of any and all items consumed in the
United States. Although various trade and economic concerns should also be considered, a
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which is inherent in a large tax base, would allow the government to
generate amounts of tax revenue under the graduated consumption tax
model that would be comparable to the income tax system without
prohibitively increasing tax rates. As an example, compare the graduated
consumption tax model to the income tax system for the 2003 tax year. 144
The income tax system generated approximately $1.953 trillion in
total revenue for the 2003 tax year.145 For 2003, the graduated consumption
tax base would have equaled about $17.895 trillion.146 In order to generate
the same amount of revenue as the income tax for that year, the mean taxexclusive rate under the graduated consumption tax model would have had
to equal about 10.6 percent.147 Even assuming twenty percent avoidance,
evasion, and erosion of the tax base, the mean tax-exclusive rate would

related question is whether purchases of products manufactured and sold by United States
companies outside of the United States should nevertheless be subject to the consumption
tax.
144
The 2003 tax year is used as an example only because that year provided the most
accessible date points.
145
The figure drops to approximately $1.9 trillion after subtracting the $52.8 billion in
the revenue generated from excise taxes. IRS, 2005 Fiscal Year Data Table, available at
http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/taxstats/compliancestats/article/0,,id=97168,00.html (last visited
June 2, 2006).
146
The tax base was calculated by adding the figures for 2003 listed in the National
Income and Products Accounts (“NIPA”) Tables, provided by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. All of the tables relied upon for these calculations are available at
http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=N (last visited June 2,
2006). According to NIPA table 2.4.5, line 1, personal consumption expenditures totaled
$7.71 trillion in 2003. Government receipts totaled $1.89 trillion and government
expenditures totaled $ 2.316 trillion in 2003, according to NIPA table 3.2, lines 36 and 39,
respectively. Corporate consumption of fixed capital plus adjustments totaled $1.548
trillion in 2003, according to NIPA tables 7.5 & 7.6, line 1, and total compensation of
employees private and public totaled $6.321 trillion in 2003, according to NIPA table 6.2D.
Accordingly, $7.71 + $2.316 + $1.548 + $6.321 = $17.895 trillion.
147
The figure was calculated in the following manner: $1.9 trillion ÷ $17.895 trillion =
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remain relatively low at about 13.3 percent.148 By comparison, under the
income tax system, the average tax rate for the individual taxpayer was also
about thirteen percent in 2003.149 Thus, unlike the national sales tax,150 the
average tax rate would not significantly increase under the graduated
consumption tax model.151
The graduated consumption tax model could also significantly

10.6%.
148

The figure was calculated in the following manner: $17.895 x .8 = $14.316 trillion;
$1.9 trillion ÷ $14.316 trillion = 13.3%.
149
Internal Revenue Service website, Individual Tax Rates and Shares, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/03inrate.pdf (last visited June 2, 2006).
150
Cf. supra note 75 and accompanying text. See also William G. Gale, The National
Retail Sales Tax: What Would the Rate Have to Be?, TAX NOTES 890, 898-899 (May 16,
2005), available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/gale/20050516.pdf (last
visited June 2, 2006). “For example, if evasion occurred at the same rate in the sales tax as
in the income tax and if the sales tax did not cover interest payments such as mortgages and
credit card payments, 20 percent of the consumption base would be lost. In that case, even
with no avoidance and with all other consumption (including health, housing, and food)
fully taxed, the required 10-year rate would rise to 39 percent tax-inclusive (65 percent taxexclusive). If, in addition, state and local purchases were omitted from the federal sales tax,
the 10-year revenue-neutral federal sales tax rate would rise to 45 percent tax-inclusive (82
percent tax-exclusive). To replace just the personal income tax and corporate income taxes
with a sales tax would require a tax inclusive rate about 60 percent as large as the rates
quoted above. Thus, if 20 percent of the proposed consumption base were not taxed and
state and local governments were not taxed, replacing the personal and corporate income
taxes would require a 27 percent tax inclusive (36 percent tax-exclusive) rate over the next
decade.” Id. at 890.
151
Please note the formula is not intended as a proof, but as an indication that the
graduated consumption tax might be economically plausible. Naturally, a more rigorous
and economically proficient review should follow. Some scholars, for example, have
suggested that “[a] broad, but realistic, consumption tax base . . . is about forty percent of
gross domestic product.” Graetz, supra note 3, at 287 n.121. The forty percent figure,
however, may be a more realistic tax base for the VAT. See id. (noting the forty percent
figure in the context of an alternative single-rate VAT). Operating under the consumption
events theory, the graduated consumption tax demands a more comprehensive consumption
tax base. See supra notes 123 & 140-50 and accompanying text.
Note also that the term ‘mean tax rate’ is intended to reflect an average of all the
various tax rates implemented during consumption over the course of the year. Actual tax
rates would vary according to tier, step, and character. Furthermore, individuals and
entities concerned they would lose the benefit of their deductions under the graduated
consumption tax model should wait to compare their total tax liabilities under each system.
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reduce enforcement costs. Under the graduated consumption tax system,
the government would not have to chase and prosecute as many taxpayers
as it does now because combined taxpayer avoidance and evasion should
occur less frequently under a graduated consumption tax model than under
the current income tax system.152

Accordingly, it seems likely that

enforcement costs under the graduated consumption tax model would
probably be less than under the present income tax regime, especially if the
cost associated with enforcing any other sales tax were a relevant
indicator.153
The graduated consumption tax would not shift the overall tax
liability. As in the contemporary graduated income tax system, the wealthy,
who would continue to consume more luxurious items,154 would continue to
shoulder most of the tax burden. Conversely, the poor would enjoy a

152

See infra notes 195-207 and accompanying text.
Some experts have suggested that “while compliance with the retail sales tax is
quite good (aside from the mail order sales problem and the growing electronic commerce
problem), a primary reason is that current tax rates are modest, giving rise to only modest
incentives for evasion and avoidance.” Matthew N. Murray, Would Tax Evasion and Tax
Avoidance Undermine a National Retail Sales Tax?, 50 NAT’L TAX JOURNAL 167, 168
(Mar. 1997). Finishing the thought, attempts at evasion would rise in proportion to the
increase in relative tax rate. Such a prediction would clearly be plausible and perhaps even
probable. While the incentive for evasion under the graduated consumption tax model may
be relatively similar to the present income tax system, evading income taxes seems easier
to accomplish by simply not filing income taxes. Logically, the number of attempted
evasions would be less under a system more difficult to cheat. Moreover, a similar
enforcement structure accompanied with joint liability for both parties to the transaction
along with stiff penalties, such as fines, liens, and prison time, seem an appropriate and
significant disincentive for evasion to both seller and buyer alike. Furthermore, combined
taxpayer avoidance and evasion should occur less than under the present income tax
system. See infra notes 195-207 and accompanying text.
154
See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
153
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relatively tax-free lifestyle. Those who would be able to afford little more
than that which is necessary to sustain themselves or their families would
pay little, if any, tax at all.
The graduated consumption tax system would also make debt easier
to avoid by attaching price tags to luxury items that would force taxpayers
to spend within their means. Taxpayers, particularly the self-employed,
would no longer make errors by underestimating their tax liabilities when
calculating their spending capital. Since taxpayers would keep all their
income, and since tax liability would be built into the price of each item,
they would know exactly how much they can afford to spend.155 Thus, debt
may be easier to avoid because the graduated consumption tax model
encourages saving and responsible spending.156
In addition, since consumption tax would be factored into the price
155

At least taxpayers would no longer be able to blame debt on underestimated income
tax liability. While debt may still be a problem under the graduated consumption tax
model, it would make it easier for the responsible consumer to avoid.
156
Alan Greenspan remarked recently that “many economists believe a consumption
tax would be best from the perspective of promoting economic growth – particularly if one
were designing a tax system from scratch – because a consumption tax is likely to
encourage saving and capital formation.” Fox News article entitled Greenspan:
Consumption Tax Could Help Economy (Mar. 3, 2005). At the very least, a consumption
tax would not punish those who save rather than spend their money. See Bradford, supra
note 82, at 390 (“The most obvious way in which a consumption tax differs from an
income tax is in the variation of burdens among people with different tastes or necessities
to save. In the context of the assumption that people with the same lifetime resources as
defined above have access to the same consumption possibilities (‘perfect capital
markets’), a consumption tax that satisfies the second property (no tax on savings) is
neutral among equally endowed individuals. By contrast, an income tax places a relatively
heavy burden on those who save, or rather on those whose lifetime resources are paid to
them relatively early and on those whose tastes favor later consumption.”). Encouraging
savings and responsible spending, however, does not mean that the graduated consumption
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of every item, taxpayers would be effectively empowered with the ability to
choose when and where to spend or save their money.

In this way,

taxpayers would receive a symbolic benefit from paying taxes that is not
apparent under the income tax model.157 Income taxpayers are required
simply to pay taxes without information or indication as to how their taxes
would be spent. Rather than simply paying taxes in abstraction, each tax
payment under the graduated consumption tax model would produce an
immediately tangible benefit in the item purchased. Since the graduated
consumption tax would tax consumption like a sales tax, paying taxes
would serve more than a purely intangible role, as taxpayers would regard
taxes as the price of consumption.

V. EXAMINING THE WEAKNESSES OF THE GRADUATED CONSUMPTION TAX
MODEL

The graduated consumption tax raises many questions, all of which
must be answered before such a system may be implemented responsibly.
Perhaps the most important question is whether it would be possible, as a
matter of fact or theory, to ascribe fair value judgments as to the necessity
or luxury of different items. The answer depends on whether there is some

tax model would try to exert control over consumer spending. See infra notes 184-91 and
accompanying text.
157
Studies have indicated that taxpayers perceive little value from the government in
exchange for their tax payments. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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economic model that can be implemented reliably to draw these distinctions
in inherent value.
The character of an item may be a function of a number of different
factors, likely including the basic utility of the product, the average market
price of categorically similar items, and the degree of public benefit derived
from the product.158

These factors may be weighted as variables in a

mathematical equation formulated to derive a standardized ranking. The
item’s standardized rank could then be used to numerically categorize that
item’s degree of necessity or luxury.
For example, under the illustrative six-tiered graduated consumption
tax model, each respective step within a tier would be assigned to a range of
numerical rankings.

Once the standardized ranking of an item was

calculated, the character, tier, and step of that item would correspond to the
appropriate range. Consider the following table and example for illustrative
purposes:
Tier

Degree

First Tier:
Fundamental Necessity
Second Tier:
Moderate Necessity
(1% Steps)

(No subdivision)

158

Numerical Rank
(Range)
0 through 80

First Step

81 through 207

Second Step

208 through 472

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Third Step

473 through 784

Fourth Step

785 through 1224
and so on . . .

Using the table,159 an item calculated with a standardized ranking of 562
would fall within the third step of the second tier. Using the tax rates from
the previous table,160 the tax on that item would equal three percent. Under
this system, products would be grouped into a multitude of different
categories that contained practically similar or nearly identical items. All
the items in each category would be assigned the same standardized rank.161
The ability to identify the character of an item would be powerful.
Placing that power exclusively into the hands of the government could be
unwise.162 Placing that power into the hands of an independent agency with
government and public oversight, however, may seem like the safer bet.
The independent agency should consist of a non-partisan panel of tax
professionals, economics experts, and other specialists who would conduct
transparent sessions and would be accountable to the government and the

159

Once again, the table and its contents and included for illustrative purposes only.
See supra note 109 and accompanying text and tables.
161
Manufacturers and retailers would be required to publish the rank of each item on
the item itself, as a label or within the product’s bar code.
162
Of course, many state and local governments have already been making these value
judgments in the application of their respective sales taxes without significant objection or
problem for quite some time. For instance, many sales taxes exempt necessary items like
certain types of food and medicine. See, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 6369 (Deering
2006) (exempting certain medicines from sales tax).
160
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public.163

Government and public oversight and accountability would

ensure that such experts would be applying accurately the appropriate
equations to objectively calculate the right tax rates and item
characterization.164

A. Administrative Concerns of the Graduated Consumption Tax Model

Even if item characterization were possible, government reports
imply that the graduated consumption tax model would be administratively
unsound. In 1998, the General Accounting Office released a study in which
it presented analysis on major tax alternatives.165 Regardless of which
alternative tax methodology it studied, the GAO repeated one theme very
clearly: whatever the system, multiple tax rates should be avoided because
they would be more difficulty to administer reliably.166 A 1984 Treasury

163

Members may be appointed to the independent agency through Congressional
committees, much like federal judicial appointments. In fact, the transparency and
legitimacy of the system might be well preserved by creating a special tax court whereby
taxpayers may sue to challenge the characterization of any particular item.
164
Under this scenario, the legislation might outline a procedure like the following:
The independent agency would draft a tax proposal and submit it for a certain period of
time for public review. Through the appropriate procedures, likely through their own
representatives, taxpayers may voice concerns or comments about the proposal for review
ultimately by Congress which, under public hearings, would ultimately ratify the proposal,
reject it, or return it to the agency for revision. If sent back to the agency for revision, once
revised, the proposal would travel through the same procedure again until it was finally
ratified by Congress and enacted into law.
165
GAO, supra note 48, at 55-188.
166
For instance, when analyzing the subtraction VAT, the GAO made the following
recommendation: “To be administrable, a subtraction VAT should have only one rate.
Although multiple rates add complexity to a credit VAT, with a subtraction VAT
businesses simply could not keep track of the rates paid at the intermediate production
stages. If more than one rate applied, the net difference between sales and purchases could
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Report (hereinafter the “Report”) echoed an identical sentiment.167
Since the graduated consumption tax is structurally similar to the
VAT or a national sales tax, it has similar administrative benefits.168 When
considering the VAT or a national sales tax, however, the Report stated that
“there should be only one rate of tax, and it should be applied to a
comprehensive tax base.”169

In support of its conclusion, the Report

suggested that the administration of a system utilizing multiple rates would
be “greatly complicated” and overburden retailers, such as grocery clerks,
with the “necessity to know which rate to apply to any given item and the
obligation to make the proper distinction as sales are made.”170
Undoubtedly, the administration of multiple or differential tax rates
would be more complicated than administering a single tax rate. But the
increase in complexity associated with the application of differential tax
rates under the graduated consumption tax model should not be enough to
automatically foreclose its consideration. In fact, discounting alternative
tax models that implement differential rates as administratively impractical

not be the basis for calculating the tax. Further, if multiple rates were used with a
subtraction VAT, the tax agency administering the tax would have no reliable way to
confirm a business’ claims for the volume of goods sold at lower rates, since the business,
itself, would furnish the audit information.” Id. at 146.
167
“To avoid unintended distortions in consumer behavior, a sales tax should
constitute a uniform percentage of all consumption expenditures.” Dept. of the Treasury
Report, Report to the President, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic
Growth 216 (Nov. 1984), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/taxreform/ (last visited June 30, 2006).
168
See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
169
Id. at 217.
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may be paradoxical given that the income tax system does it already.171 In
addition, such a dismissal may send the strange message that the ordinary
taxpayer would be better equipped to handle the challenge of mastering the
multiple tax rates and exceptions than the governmental agencies charged
with their administration.
Furthermore, the Report provides no conclusive findings that
administration of differential rates would be prohibitive.

The Report

instead takes the anecdotal example of the grocery store clerk who would be
forced to know that orange juice is taxed at a different rate than orange soda
and apply the differential tax rates appropriately.172 Yet, this seems no
more complicated than knowing which price tag to attach to each
product.173 Still, the Report concludes that “[d]istinctions of this type also
greatly complicate tax administration, since it is necessary for auditors to
verify the rates reported on various sales.”174
While tax administration would be more challenging under a tax
system utilizing differential tax rates, the extent to which it would
complicate tax administration remains unknown.

For example, present

technological advances could reveal that the administrative complexities are
170

Id.
The exception is, of course, that the income tax places the filing onus on the
individual taxpayer. The graduated consumption tax model proposes to remove that
burden.
172
Dept. of the Treasury Report, supra note 167, at 217.
173
Evidently, this is what grocery stores do already.
171
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more manageable than considered originally in 1984.175 Nevertheless, the
Report lists economic reasons for disfavoring the use of differential tax
rates. For example, the Report predicted that differential tax rates would
“interfere[ ] with tax neutrality by distorting consumer choices away from
highly taxed items and toward lightly taxed ones.”176 Like administrative
complexity, the potentially paternalistic economic impact of the graduated
consumption tax system is a legitimate concern.

B. Equity Concerns of the Graduated Consumption Tax Model

As a threshold matter, there is some question whether it is fairer to
tax income or consumption.

One reason to prefer taxing income

progressively is to help offset disparities in wealth.

The graduated

consumption tax model operates under the policy that income, no matter
how large, should not be taxed if the money does nothing or if it is spent
doing nothing society deems “bad.” To put it another way, money used to
do something society regards as “good” should not be penalized. The
policies of the income tax system implicitly agree with this reasoning, as
evidenced by the deductions allowed for charitable giving.177

174

Id.
In fact, there is evidence that administering a consumption tax at differential rates is
already possible. See supra notes 60, 110 and accompanying text.
176
In addition, the Report discourages assessing higher tax rates on luxuries than
necessities. Dept. of the Treasury Report, supra note 167, at 217.
177
See I.R.C. § 170 (2006).
175
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Pushing the policy to its logical conclusion, money and wealth are
“bad” for society only when they are used “badly.” Assuming this policy is
true, it makes little sense to tax income without reference to how the money
was actually spent.178 By comparison, if we were to apply income tax
policy to criminal law, society would punish those who it determines have
the largest predisposition for committing crimes without regard to whether
or not they actually committed one. Of course, adopting such a policy in
the criminal law context would be absurd. Yet, adopting the same policy in
the income tax context does not seem any better.

Accordingly, the

graduated consumption tax operates under the policy that it is fairer to tax
consumption than unspent income because taxing the former allows the
rates to correspond with how the money is used.179
The graduated consumption tax model also operates under the
premise that it is fair to attach higher tax rates to more lavish consumption.
Admittedly, attaching higher tax rates to the consumption of more luxurious
items may not seem equitable at first glance. For instance, take the example
of the modest consumer who saves her money by economizing on groceries
so she can afford to purchase the luxurious item she always wanted. Would
178

Unless one wishes to contend that money not spent is used “badly.” The graduated
consumption tax operates under the premise that savings should be encouraged over
consumption.
179
In some ways, an income tax and a consumption tax are similar: they both impose a
tax on labor earnings. See Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 97, at 1417-18. Income tax
applies progressive rates according to the amount of earnings, while the graduated
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it be fair to impose the highest rate of tax on that person’s purchase?
Before we can answer that question, we must first determine how to
reliably test fairness in taxation. On this point, recent scholarship suggests
that the most accurate way to test the inherent equity of a tax system may be
to compare the theoretical effects of similarly-situated taxpayers.180 Or, to
put it another way, perhaps fairness is best measured by balancing the
theoretical consequences of each alternative tax policy as experienced by
the same hypothetical taxpaying individual. Consequently, the inherent
equity of the graduated consumption tax model may be evaluated best using
the following example of the average wage-earning consumer:
Assume the average wage-earning consumer may be taxed under
either a progressive income tax system or a progressive consumption tax
system. Under the income tax system, the more money the individual
makes, the higher the rate of tax the person pays. But, the typical wageearner can make more money only through more work, whether in the form

consumption tax model applies progressive rates according to their use.
180
Professors Bankman and Weisbach, for instance, utilize intra-class comparisons
when discussing comparative consumption tax and income tax net redistribution.
Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 97, at 1440 (“[Under an ideal consumption tax], there is
no net redistribution from one wage class to another. We do find intraclass redistribution:
the burden of the $400,000-per-year wage eager who spends rises relative to the $400,000per-year wage earner who saves; the burden of the $20,000-per-year wager [sic] earner
who spends rises relative to [sic] burden of the $20,000-per-year wage earner who saves.”).
The authors make another important point in this section. “[C]onsumption tax is often
opposed on the grounds that, by not taxing the return to investment, it ignores the morally
relevant difference between winners and losers: investments that pay off and investments
that do not. . . . Whatever the merits of treating winners and losers differently, they have
no bearing on the choice between an income tax and a consumption tax. . . . [because] both
taxes treat returns to risk the same way. . . [and i]f it is desirable to tax risk using graduated
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of overtime, promotions, or additional employment. Under a consumption
tax system, by comparison, an individual pays a higher rate of tax only
when he or she chooses to consume a more luxurious item.
Ultimately, in this consideration, equity boils down to a simple
choice: whether to attach higher tax rates to the choice to work more or to
attach higher tax rates to the choice to consume more lavishly. In both
situations, personal liberty is at stake to some extent, whether in the form of
the freedom in the choice of consumption or the freedom in the choice of
labor.181 Conventional wisdom might find the thought of attaching higher
tax rates to a consumer’s decision to buy a more luxurious item to be
counterintuitive. But, attaching a higher rate of tax to the fruits of that
person’s decision to work more seems equally inappropriate.182

The

graduated consumption tax operates under the premise that it is fair –
perhaps even virtuous – to encourage productivity while discouraging

rates, both income and consumption taxes can do so.” Id. at 1440-41.
181
This example assumes an average wage-earner who is not seriously in debt.
Coincidentally, consumers seriously in debt may need some incentive to reexamine their
spending preferences.
182
Some scholars have concluded that the income tax distorts both work effort and
savings while a consumption tax would distort only work effort. Bankman & Weisbach,
supra note 97, at 1422-28. If the consumption tax distorts work effort at all, the distortion
seems an indirect effect only. See id. at 1437 (“A retail sales tax is not imposed when
wages are earned. Instead, sales taxes are imposed only when the individual purchases
consumption goods, often many years after the wages are earned. One might say loosely
that a wage tax is ex ante while a retail sales tax is ex post. In fact, most consumption taxes
are largely ex post - they are imposed when consumption goods are purchased.”). While
the ordinary wage-earner may or may not have to work harder to earn enough money to
afford the luxury item – and pay the higher tax – the wage-earner does not automatically
subject herself to a higher tax rate simply because she chose to work harder, as is the case
under the income tax model. Instead, the individual is subject to the higher tax rate only
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unnecessary consumption.

Thus, attaching a higher tax rate onto an

individual’s lavish consumption is more equitable than attaching a higher
tax rate onto the sweat of that person’s brow.183

C. Economic Efficiency under the Graduated Consumption Tax Model

Some scholars have concluded that a consumption tax would
promote economic efficiency when compared to an income tax.184 Yet,
given its use of differential rates, an unintended consequence of the
graduated consumption tax model might be that it inadvertently encourages
consumer spending trends that reflect the characterization determinations
made by the government. Assigning a significantly higher tax rate on a
BMW 3-series than on a Toyota Prius, for instance, might send a message
to consumers that they should buy the Prius.

Although the graduated

consumption tax model might have some influence on consumer spending,
tax laws – like all other laws – inevitably, are largely a reflection of societal
values and governmental processes.185

when that person chooses to consume a more luxurious item.
183
Admittedly, the graduated consumption tax model reflects a conservationist
attitude.
184
Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 97, at 1455 (finding that an ideal consumption
tax “[would] generate efficiency gains”).
185
See Leah Witcher Jackson, Won the Legal Battle, but at What Tax Cost to Your
Client: Tax Consequences of Contingency Fee Arrangements Leading up to and After
Commissioner v. Banks, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 47, 56-57 (2005) (“Through tax laws,
Congress creates incentives for citizens to privately spend money on, or invest in, activities
deemed beneficial to society and, therefore, in need of our private support. Programs and
activities that citizens and businesses support voluntarily do not need as much, or any,
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Perhaps more significant is whether the graduated consumption tax
model might exaggerate class stratification.

In the last example,

encouraging the consumer to buy the Prius may impact the economy
positively if it encourages the taxpayer to spend within her or his own
means. At the same time, however, forcing taxpayers to spend within their
own means would make it more difficult for low-to-middle income persons
to afford luxury items.

Class stratification, therefore, would become

exaggerated if only the wealthy could afford items of luxury.
By attaching higher tax rates to the consumption of more luxurious
items, the graduated consumption tax model should encourage consumers to
spend within their means. A higher tax rate attached to the more luxurious
item would be an appropriate cost of luxury that, by some definitions, is
unnecessary and arguably, in some cases, detrimental to social welfare. The
high tax rate attached to the price tag may indeed be shocking for some
individuals, but perhaps the shock would bring some consumers to their
senses about the realistic expectations they should have about their standard
of living.

support from the government. The federal income tax system also discourages various
types of spending and provides punitive monetary measures for activities not favored in
society. Moreover, the tax laws influences the economy by affecting a multitude of routine
and major life choices, such as the type of housing people live in, the manner in which they
save for retirement, the structure of a new business, and the arrangement of debt.
However, some of the special rules in the Internal Revenue Code cannot be explained or
justified by the noble goal of influencing our behavior for the betterment of our society.
Sometimes the explanation for a provision is the clout of a political party or the
persuasiveness of special interest lobbies.”).
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Encouraging consumers to spend within their means may seem

paternalistic, but the influence might actually be good for the economy
because, among other things, it may have the tendency to reduce debt.186
Moreover, debt may become more manageable for the responsible
consumer who will no longer have to account accurately for large lump-sum
tax payments ever year.187 Nevertheless, successfully reducing debt and
encouraging

consumer

characterization.188

resourcefulness

presupposes

objective

item

And, since it exists already under the income tax

system, class stratification might have to do with something other than tax
rates.
But, even if the graduated consumption tax model has a net positive
economic impact, another concern is whether tax policy should influence
consumer spending at all. Any influence over spending, even an arguably
positive one, may thus be regarded as an unwelcome intrusion upon the
economic free will of the consumer. After all, it is not the government’s

186

The high price tags attached to luxurious items under the graduated consumption
tax model may reduce irresponsible spending and debt in some cases, but it may have less
impact on irresponsible spending and debt when caused by the bad decisions and poor
spending habits of the individual consumer. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
187
Under the income tax system, in any given year, the relatively responsible
consumer may suddenly find themselves seriously in debt as a result of under calculating
their tax liability. Under the graduated consumption tax model, by comparison, tax liability
will no longer be an unknown. In this way, the graduated consumption tax model makes it
easier for the responsible consumer to avoid debt.
188
Encouraging consumers to spend within their means, as well as class stratification,
might also bolster the economy by providing greater incentive for taxpayers to build wealth
through education, work, and investment so they can afford to purchase luxurious items
taxed at higher rates.
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place to dictate how its citizens should live.189 Yet, to some extent, these
concerns already exist given present interest rates and the income tax
system.190

Assuming the graduated consumption tax would be

administrable, it should have no significant impact on responsible spending
other than, perhaps, to encourage more of it.191
Manufacturers, particularly those that manufacture high-end luxury
items, would undoubtedly oppose a shift to a graduated consumption tax
model. Indeed, they may even detest the suggestion. Manufacturers might
argue that the graduated consumption tax model amounts to a disincentive
to produce high-end, luxury goods because a high tax rate attached to the
price tag of a high-end luxury item may shock an otherwise willing
consumer away from the purchase. In turn, the widespread disincentive to
buy would result in a depressed economy.
A shift to a graduated consumption tax may have a significant
dampening effect on the sales of high-end luxury items, at least temporarily
if not permanently. Still, those concerned that the graduated consumption
tax model might stifle economic prosperity must also account for the
189

For example, consider the low-income individual who wanted to save up to buy a
luxury item. The paternalism concerns are whether the consumption tax model would
attempt to control low-income consumer spending by attaching high tax rates to the price
tags of luxury items. While the graduated consumption tax might ultimately have some
paternalistic impact on spending, it is not intended to serve as a system of control. On the
contrary, the graduated consumption tax is designed to eliminate the individual taxpayer
filing burden while preserving tax progressivity. See supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
190
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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evisceration of the income tax system. The absence of income tax would
create sizable increases in disposable income that would be immediately
perceptible because taxpayers would now be pocketing all their respective
pay checks.192 The significant increase in taxpayer take-home income could
be enough to offset the disincentive to buy luxurious items that would be
created by the higher tax rates.
Moreover, those truly wealthy enough to afford luxury items should
not be hindered by the added consumption tax, especially since they would
no longer be paying an annual income tax. In fact, the high tax rate would
build an added element of exclusivity into the price of a luxury item.
Exclusivity is, essentially, the message the luxury conveys and what many
wealthy consumers are purchasing. Thus, making an item more exclusive
may make the luxurious item even more desirable and, hence, worth the
added cost.

By re-incentivizing luxurious consumption and helping to

reduce debt, a graduated consumption tax model that encourages taxpayers
to save their money and spend within their means could, theoretically
speaking, promote economy efficiency.193
Although excellent research has already been done on the efficiency

191

See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
Although this work focuses on a federal graduated consumption tax model, if the
model proves successful, states with an income tax system may also adopt it. States adding
their own graduated consumption tax on top of the federal tax should not stifle their
economies any more than they did through their state income tax systems.
193
See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
192
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gains of a consumption tax over an income tax,194 further research is
necessary to better predict the extent to which differential tax rates under a
graduated consumption tax will effect overall economic efficiency.
Certainly, a reliable prediction will depend on the actual tax rates, steps, and
characterization models finally adopted by the graduated consumption tax
model.

D. Tax Avoidance and Evasion under the Graduated Consumption Tax
Model

Tax avoidance and evasion may occur less frequently under the
graduated consumption tax model.

Indeed, given the broad tax base,

overwhelming tax participation seems unavoidable, as consumption is
necessary for survival.195 Still, tax avoidance would be possible. While the
194

See Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 97, at 1455 (“Supporters of an income tax
have argued that any efficiency gains realized from switching to a consumption tax are
overstated. They argue that eliminating the tax on savings will require higher taxes on
wages and that any efficiency gains from eliminating the first tax will be reduced or offset
by the efficiency loss from increasing the latter tax. . . . We show that none of these
arguments is correct.”).
195
See supra note 139 and accompanying text. While evasion and efficiency under a
comprehensive tax base may generate unresolved empirical questions, there is evidence
that a comprehensive tax base “should reduce the opportunity of tax avoidance since it
reduces differential treatment of items.” James R. Repetti, The Uneasy Case for a
Comprehensive Tax Base 18 (Boston College Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 99, 2006). Although Professor Repetti’s paper discusses evasion and efficiency under
a comprehensive income tax base, his conclusion that tax avoidance would be reduced
under a comprehensive income tax base may also apply to the comprehensive tax base of
the graduated consumption tax model. See id. Professor Repetti concludes that tax
avoidance should be reduced because a comprehensive tax base, which allows lower
marginal tax rates, “reduces differential treatment of items.” Id. Although the graduated
consumption tax utilizes differential tax rates, differential treatment of items would be
eliminated under the graduated consumption tax model because all items would be subject
to tax and similar items consumed would be subject to the same tax. Accordingly, one
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graduated consumption tax model may encourage responsible spending and
savings, the wealthy may be able to avoid tax liability simply by reducing
their consumption of luxuries. Of course, while the rich can choose to live
poorly, it is not likely.196

Even if some wealthy consumers do live

modestly, the graduated consumption tax model is premised upon the theory
that an individual should be taxed according to how lavishly that person
actually consumes and not on the amount of that person’s unspent
income.197 So, under a policy designed to tax lavish consumption, even a
wealthy person should enjoy the tax benefits of a conscious decision to
consume less.198 Indeed, such behavior should be encouraged, especially
for those individuals or entities with an otherwise unchecked affinity or
unlimited ability to consume lavishly without hesitation or restriction.
Tangentially, however, it is conceivable that a wealthy person could
consume excessive amounts of items characterized ordinarily as necessary
without enduring adverse tax consequences. For example, a wealthy person

could avoid the tax only if one did not consume. Furthermore, since the character and
resultant tax rate would be predetermined, there would be no opportunity to “avoid” the tax
by re-classification except, of course, by fraud. Fraudulent or otherwise illegal attempts to
minimize or eliminate tax liability are not tax avoidance, but tax evasion. Id. at 1 n.1. See
also infra notes 200-207 and accompanying text.
196
In fact, the Department of Labor reported that, in 2003, consumer units earning
$150,000 or more “spent more for every item examined than did the less-than-$70,000
group.” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Issues in Labor Statistics, Summary 06-02 (Jan.
2006), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ils/pdf/opbils54.pdf (last visited June 2,
2006).
197
See supra notes 113, 123 and accompanying text.
198
Such a policy may indeed be Hobbesian. See supra note 123 and accompanying
text. Regardless, a tax policy that encourages savings – or, at least, one that does not
punish savings – should be preferred to one that discourages it. See supra note 156 and
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could decide to host lavish events every night, buying food and drink for
multitudes of people while paying a minimum amount of tax.

The

graduated consumption tax model, however, anticipates such events. While
food in general may be characterized as “necessary,” different types of food
would be characterized very differently. Most likely, the wealthy host
would offer a different character of food and drink than lower-income
taxpayers would provide for their families. Accordingly, while food may be
generally characterized as necessary, certain food items – like Champagne
and caviar for instance – would be characterized as more luxurious and, as
such, assessed at significantly higher tax rates.199
Although tax avoidance concerns may be minimal, tax evasion may
be a more significant concern under the graduated consumption tax
model.200 Although regulating sellers to ensure the proper application of

accompanying text.
199
Admittedly, the wealthy host could consume excessive amounts of food
characterized as necessary without incurring significant tax liability. Yet, the thought of
someone like Hugh Hefner or Donald Trump serving only fish sticks and tater tots to the
celebrity guests of their extravagant events seems almost laughably improbable.
200
Professor Repetti concludes that tax evasion is an unresolved empirical question
under a comprehensive income tax model. Repetti, supra note 195, at 17. Although his
conclusion might also apply to the graduated consumption tax model, his analysis must
accommodate the theoretical fact that most forms of tax evasion under the graduated
consumption tax model would be more complicated, and perhaps more difficult, tasks than
simply failing to file a tax return. For instance, tax evasion might have to look something
like the following: Manufacturer makes a deal with seller that seller would mislabel a
product purchased from manufacturer in order to qualify for a lower tax rate. Seller would
then sell the product to buyer, either at market price or at a calculated discount enough to
make a larger profit due to the lowered tax rate. Alternatively, manufacturer makes a deal
with seller that seller would mislabel a product purchased from the manufacturer in order to
qualify for a lower tax rate but, instead of selling the product at market price, seller instead
sells it at a rate that would produce a significant profit only upon a high volume of sales.
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the tax program seems like a relatively straightforward task, in his analysis
of the national sales tax, William G. Gale expressed some concerns about
tax evasion.201 While most of those concerns are particular to the national
sales tax model only,202 some could apply to the graduated consumption tax
model as well. 203
For example, Gale envisions that “[i]t will [] prove very difficult to
collect high-rate sales taxes from a number of small-scale service industries
– taxi cab drivers, plumbers, handy men, painters, maids, etc. are classic
examples.”204

This problem is significant under the national sales tax

model because the sales tax imposed would be a fixed percentage and,
while the scale is small, the volume of sales in these industries is high.
Accordingly, tax evasion in this situation could have a significant adverse
affect upon revenue generation.
Tax evasion in the high-rate sales from small-scale service industries
may be less of a problem under the graduated consumption tax model.

The latter scheme would allow the seller, effectively, to sell an otherwise characteristically
luxurious item at a lower price therein undercutting the competition.
The exception is that businesses could also evade taxes by simply failing to report
sales. While periodically auditing the inventories of such businesses could help solve this
problem for the sales of goods, the failure to report the sales of services, or the
underreporting of such sales, could pose a challenging problem. See GAO, supra note 48,
at 143 (noting a Canadian study that reported “the potential for ‘skimming’
(underreporting) or nonreporting of legitimate business receipts with the Canadian VAT is
greatest in the service sector, similar to the U.S. income tax”).
201
Gale, supra note 76, at 451-53.
202
Exploitation of the $2,000 off-shore credit under the national sale tax, for example.
Id. at 452.
203
See id. at 452-53.
204
Id. at 452.
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Most of the small-scale services described would probably be assessed at
marginal tax rates due to the necessary character of these services, e.g.,
transportation, housing maintenance, etc.

Under contemporary evasion

theory, a moderate tax rate would generate only moderate incentives for
evasion.205 Furthermore, depending on the moderation of the assessed rate,
the effect on revenue may be as insignificant as the undeclared cash wages
and tips under the present income tax system.
Furthermore, the graduated consumption tax would incorporate the
same security mechanisms as the credit-invoice VAT. Under the national
sales tax model, by comparison, fraud is a more serious concern because,
unlike the income tax system, there would be no required third-party
reporting.206 Without third-party reporting, commerce would be under the
“honor system” where it would be far easier to cheat. Third-party reporting,
however, would exist under the graduated consumption tax model because,

205

See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
Gale, supra note 76, at 452 (“More generally, the two parties to a sale will have
incentives to report lower-than-accurate transaction prices to the government coupled with
side payments. The true transaction price and the side payments could easily be shielded
via complex financial arrangements. . . . For income where taxes are withheld and reported
to the government by a third-party, the evasion rate is about one percent. This is
predominantly withholding of taxes on wages. At the other extreme, for income where
taxes are not withheld and there is no reporting, the evasion rate is 30 percent or more. In
contrast, the pure retails sales tax would be collected only from businesses that make retail
sales, and there would be no withholding or reporting by anyone other than the business
itself. That is, the entity reporting the tax payment would also be the entity legally
responsible for the tax liability. Because the pure retail sales tax would feature no thirdparty withholding or reporting, the possibility of high rates of evasion needs to be taken
quite seriously.”). Of course, a system that requires more complicated mechanisms to
successfully evade tax liability is a system that is more difficult to cheat and, therefore, a
system where evasion would occur less. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
206
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like the credit-invoice VAT, the authenticity of all transactions and the
resultant tax can be verified by comparing the invoices of the businesses
and individuals involved at any point in the production, distribution, and
retail chains.207
Reduced evasion incentives generated by a low average tax rate
combined with the regular auditing along all levels of the stream of
commerce and the imposition of stiff penalties and fines against the
offenders may result in decreased tax evasion under the graduated
consumption tax model. Even assuming evasion rates were comparable to
the income tax system, given the significant decrease in tax avoidance, the
combination of revenue lost under both avoidance and evasion may likely
be less than the combined avoidance and evasion that occurs presently
under the income tax system.

E. Mortgage Interest, Investments, and Health Care under the Graduated
Consumption Tax Model

The current income tax system provides deductions that encourage
home-ownership.208

Perhaps the most significant among them is the

deduction for mortgage interest.209 Mortgage payments would be taxable

207

See supra notes 53-54. Like the credit-invoice VAT, the largest evasion challenge
for the graduated consumption tax may be the failure to report the sales of services. See
supra note 200 and accompanying text.
208
I.R.C. § 163 (2005).
209
See id.
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under the graduated consumption tax model. Like anything else, borrowed
money would be taxable once it was consumed. A lender loans money to a
borrower so the borrower can purchase an item of significant value that the
borrower otherwise could not afford to purchase on her or his own.210 The
borrower uses the money loaned to make the large purchase.211

The

borrower then repays the loan incrementally at a negotiated interest rate.
The total repayment amount, which equals the sum of the principal
plus interest, is the borrower’s cost of purchasing the home.212
Accordingly, the entire repayment amount would be subject to consumption
tax. Although mortgage interest would be taxable under the graduated
consumption tax model, the amount of tax would likely be negligible for
most taxpayers because home payments, principal and interest included,
would be characterized as necessities in most cases.213
Investments, such as stocks and mutual funds, would be subject to

210

This analysis assumes a typical home owner.
As collateral, the lender attaches the item as security for the loan.
212
The lender may be ignored for consumption tax purposes because, by lending
money, it is technically not consuming anything. Lending institutions, incidentally, may
favor a graduated consumption tax model for this reason. This policy, however, may
encourage lending institutions to loan money more generously, in turn, helping consumers
achieve certain benchmarks, such as home ownership.
213
Unless, of course, the home purchased is a luxurious one. Large consumable items,
like homes, may be subject to more specific characterization procedures. For instance,
such purchases may be characterized at the time of purchase. Characterization of homes,
for example, could include an examination of local market price averages, the size, age,
and condition of the home, the existence of any renovations, the size of the lot,
consideration of the relevant zoning laws and surrounding areas, number of homes already
owned by the purchaser, and other similar factors. Like property tax assessments, buyers
and sellers could be permitted to present the assessing agency with evidence they believe
was most relevant to characterization.
211
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taxation upon the purchase of shares by the investor. The equity built or
lost, however, would be subject to no tax burden or benefit. Under the
graduated consumption tax theory, savings and equity or income generation
would not be taxable; rather, it would be only the consumption events that
trigger tax liability. So, once an item was consumed and the tax was paid,
no further tax liability for the owner would attach.
Similarly, aside from an incidental sales tax,214 most taxpayers do
not presently pay taxes on health care services.

Under the graduated

consumption tax theory, however, the consumption of services would not be
distinguishable from the consumption of tangible items.

Accordingly,

health care services would also be subject to taxation. Nevertheless, the
amount of tax assessed on most health care services provided would
probably be zero, or some percentage close to zero, because most health
care services would be characterized as necessary.215

F. Inflation and Interest Rates under the Graduated Consumption Tax
Model

Inflation may increase significantly during the period of transition
from the current income tax system to the graduated consumption tax

214

Noting, of course, the common exemptions. See, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §
6369 (Deering 2006) (exempting certain medicines from sales tax).
215
Some health care services, such as those that fall within the category of purely
cosmetic surgery, would be classified as luxurious and subject to a significantly higher tax
rate.
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model.

Under the graduated consumption tax model, however,

manufacturers and sellers would no longer expend large amounts of money
on income and payroll taxes. Accordingly, since these costs would no
longer need to be incorporated into the price of the items sold, the pre-tax
market price of consumables might decrease.
Still, adding a sometimes significant tax on top of market prices may
generate a rise in the general level of market prices. Initially, higher prices
might scare consumers into reduced spending.216

During this period,

consumers may be more selective about the products and services they
purchase which, in turn, may force manufacturers and retailers to compete
by providing higher quality products and services until the market finally
adjusts to the change. By then, however, consumer expectations may be
reset and manufacturers and retailers may be required to maintain the same
high level of quality and service experienced beyond the transitional period.
While inflation may increase during the transitional period, interest
rates may nevertheless decline under a graduated consumption tax model.
Household and business savings would grow, as they would no longer be
taxed, allowing for more spending and investment. Lending institutions
would likewise have more money to lend to consumers who may, in turn,
seek to borrow more money, all of which may help to keep interest rates
216

That is, until taxpayers learn to finally trust the permanency of their increased
paychecks that would accompany the evisceration of the income tax.
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relatively under control. Moreover, interest rates may be reduced during the
transitional period due to a market surplus of previously safeguarded
capital, as the need for domestic and offshore tax shelters would vanish
along with the income tax.217

G. Miscellaneous Considerations of the Graduated Consumption Tax
Model

Current tax professionals might oppose a shift to the graduated
consumption tax model out of fear they may lose work. The public tax
professionals, such as those that work at the Internal Revenue Service,
should not worry. The heart of the graduated consumption tax model is its
tax indexes and rate schedules. These documents would itemize every
general and specific category of consumable item, categorize it under the
appropriate degree of necessity or luxury, and assess the appropriate
graduated tax rate.

The indexes and schedules would need to be

continuously updated and modified and would require thousands of public
tax professionals working in collaboration with various other public and
private sector experts to study, compute, recalculate, and implement
periodic consumption tax rate indexes, schedules, and tables.

Such an

endeavor may actually generate more work for public tax professionals than

217

See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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presently required.218
Private tax professionals may also voice concerns about a shift to the
graduated consumption tax model. Unlike the public tax professionals, the
shift to a graduated consumption tax model would bring with it the
obsolescence of individual income tax planning.

The loss of the tax

professional’s individual income tax planning work, however, would be
greatly outweighed by the public benefit enjoyed by removing the
individual taxpayer’s filing burdens and liabilities associated with tax
computation. In fact, tax planning developed as a reaction to the increasing
burdens of tax computation and filing.

Removing the need for tax

assistance would be equitable, therefore, given the purpose of the assistance
was to alleviate the burden that created it.

Furthermore, the tax

professional’s career would not be eviscerated along with the income tax
system. Tax professionals may still be necessary to aid merchants and
consumers with characterization assessments or re-evaluation.219
Some taxpayers might oppose the shift to a graduated consumption
tax model on the ground that it would reduce taxpayer control over

218

Much of today’s tax work is done by individual taxpayers who, unlike the public
tax professionals, are not compensated for their work. The graduated consumption tax
model is designed to alleviate the individual taxpayer’s burden of computing their
respective tax liability by shifting the responsibility of tax computation onto the
government. Removing the benefit of the free labor would create a gap in work that public
tax professionals would be required to fill. Shifting the labor burden onto the government
could generate more jobs for public tax professional than are necessary under the current
income tax system.
219
See, e.g., supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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computing the tax they owe.220 These taxpayers might contend that the
income tax system allows for some clever tax planning that can result in
some level of tax avoidance that would not be available under the graduated
consumption tax model. The concern, however, is a relatively weak one
because preventing unequal access to tax breaks or other loopholes would
be a net social benefit of the graduated consumption tax model that greatly
outweighs the individual taxpayer’s benefits of tax avoidance.221
In the end, while experts may support the implementation of some
form of a consumption tax model, many suspect implementation of a
consumption tax model may prove impracticable.222

While the costs

associated with transition should be considered, there would also be
concerns about the fair treatment of taxpayers and their previous tax plans,
which relied upon the existence of the present tax system.223

While

transition concerns are clearly important, the degree of difficulty associated
with transition appears a subject of present debate.224 For instance, some
220

Ironically, some taxpayers might argue that laying the burden of tax calculation and
filing on the taxpayer is a good thing, at least insofar as it allows for clever tax planning
that may avoid some tax liability. Naturally, this argument begs the question of whether
taxpayer cleverness should play any role in determining (and avoiding) tax liability.
221
See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
222
Alan Greenspan had indicated: “As you know, many economists believe that a
consumption tax would be best from the perspective of promoting economic growth –
particularly if one were designing a tax system from scratch – because consumption tax is
likely to encourage savings and capital formation. However, getting from the current tax
system to a consumption tax raises a challenging set of transition issues.” Fox News,
Greenspan: Consumption Tax Could Help Economy (Mar. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,149298,00.html (last visited June 2, 2006)..
223
See infra notes 236-38 and accompanying text.
224
See, e.g., Americans for Fair Taxation, Response to William Gale at 9 (Mar. 16,
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scholars surmise that transition problem may not be as overwhelming as
originally anticipated.225 Regardless, transition issues are probably best
resolved after the initial questions raised by the graduated consumption tax
model are answered satisfactorily.

VI. BRIEF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE GRADUATED
CONSUMPTION TAX MODEL

The Constitution presents no significant obstacle for the graduated
consumption tax. The Constitution provides that “[t]he Congress shall have
the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the
debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the
United States . . . .”226

Congress’s virtually plenary power to tax is

nevertheless subject to two important limitations.227 First, the tax must be
uniformly applied throughout the states.228 Second, direct taxes must be
apportioned.229 These limitations are mutually exclusive.230

1998) (“If it is fair to hold people harmless against adverse changes in the tax law, then it is
equally fair to tax people on windfall gains accruing because taxes they planned to pay
when the made an investment have been repealed.”), available at
http://www.fairtaxvolunteer.org/smart/GaleRebuttal.pdf (last visited June 2, 2006).
225
Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 97, at 1438 (“[I]t is quite a different thing to
believe that an income tax is desirable than to believe that a consumption tax is desirable
but hindered by a serious transition problem. Research agendas would shift from
determining how to perfect the income tax to how to transition out of it.”).
226
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
227
97 COLUM. L. REV. at 2340.
228
Id. (citing Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83-106 (1900)).
229
Id. at 2340-41 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4; U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV).
230
Id. at 2341 (citing Nelson Lund, Comment, The Uniformity Clause, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1193, 1195 n.5 (1984) (“The Court has generally assumed that once a tax is found to
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A sales tax is “a classic indirect tax” because it does not tax

individuals but, rather, the goods or services they decide to buy.231
Accordingly, a traditional sales tax is not subject to the apportionment
limitation232 and is generally considered a constitutional indirect tax when
applied uniformly throughout the states.233 Since imposing a national sales
tax would be constitutional, imposing a graduated consumption tax would
likewise be constitutional so long as it was applied uniformly.234 Moreover,
since the graduated consumption tax is not a tax on income, it would not
require the authority granted under the Sixteenth Amendment.235 Thus, the
Sixteenth Amendment may be appropriately repealed upon implementation
of the graduated consumption tax.
Interestingly, although the graduated consumption tax may be
constitutional itself, some constitutional questions might arise during the
transition to its implementation from the present income tax system.236

be outside the reach of the apportionment clause, it is within the reach of the uniformity
clause.”)).
231
Id. at 2405.
232
See id. at 2341, 2405.
233
97 COLUM. L. REV. at 2405-06 (“As long as a value-added tax (or other form of
national sales tax) is uniform in its application, it should survive constitutional scrutiny. . . .
[because they are both] classic indirect tax-like duties, imposts, and excises – and the
founders thought that taxes on articles of consumption presented no constitutional
problems.”).
234
Id.
235
See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”)
236
97 COLUM. L. REV. at 2406 (“There are two minor areas of uncertainty in this
analysis; neither should change the result. One difficulty is that a consumption tax might
be characterized, in some circumstances, as a tax on the ownership of property – for
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Specifically, transitional relief might be required to avoid double taxation of
“old capital.”237 Such relief could amount to a direct tax, which would raise
different constitutional considerations.238

Ultimately, the constitutional

implications of granting potential transitional relief should not adversely
affect the overall constitutionality of implementing the graduated
consumption tax.239

CONCLUSION

Nothing in this world is perfect. Like anything else, pointing out the
problems of the income tax system is easy. The true test of creativity is not
finding the perfect solution, but imagining a better one.

And while

imagining a graduated consumption tax model may be exciting, the true test
is whether the model will unravel when confronted by reality.
The foundation of the graduated consumption tax system would
depend on the creation of an objective, precise, and transparent
characterization model.

The characterization model, however, is

example, if the consumption is attributable to the income from real estate. . . . Of perhaps
greater potential significance are the problems that would arise from a transition to a
consumption tax. . . . The most commonly noted issue associated with the move to a
consumption tax is how ‘old capital’ should be treated – capital that was accumulated on an
after-tax basis under the current tax regime but the consumption from which would be
taxed under a consumption-tax regime as well. Without transition relief, something like
double taxation of the old capital could occur.”)
237
Id. Some scholars, however, suggest that “taxation of retiree consumption might
produce efficiency gains that could be used to fund lower overall rates for everyone.”
Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 97, at 1438.
238
Id. Such considerations are beyond the scope of this introductory article.
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incomplete without an equally competent economic model to assess
reasonable and appropriate tax rates. The model and its theory must also be
tested carefully to ensure reasonable administration as well as the fair and
practical application among all taxpayers.

And even if all of this is

successfully accomplished, a thoughtfully-tailored transitional plan must yet
be engineered and executed without overwhelming difficulty.
Assuming the dream outlives this journey, its transition to reality
would also demand the courage and conviction necessary to overcome fear
and political inertia. But, if the graduated consumption tax model proves
workable, it seems foolish not to consider implementing it. Even so, “[a]
foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little
statesmen, scholars, and divines,”240 and the graduated consumption tax’s
fate may be predetermined by those too invested or too afraid to give it a
chance. Perhaps appropriately, a foolish consistency is something only
imagination and faith can overcome.

239

See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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